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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three essays on political economy and development 
economics.  
The first essay, entitled ‘What Underlies Weak States? The Role of Terrain 
Ruggedness’, examines the effect of rugged topography on state capacity, 
namely, the ability of the state to commit to policies, collect taxes, and provide 
public goods and security over its territory. Specifically, the essay considers 
state capacity as an outcome of collective action and terrain ruggedness as a 
factor impeding cooperation among the state’s constituents. As state capacity is 
best observed by means of its outcomes, four latent variables are used as 
proxies for its measurement—inflation, rule of law, taxation performance, and 
presence of civil war. Using a dataset of 190 independent countries over the 
period 1960–2010 and an index of terrain ruggedness quantifying accurately 
topographic irregularities, the results demonstrate that an increase in terrain 
ruggedness significantly hinders state capacity. Moreover, it is found that more 
rugged countries have experienced delays in urbanisation and it is through this 
channel that some functions of the state may have been reduced over time. The 
study undertakes many robustness checks to substantiate its main finding, such 
as accounting for spillover effects due to shared topographical characteristics 
across bordering countries. Overall, the evidence suggests that irregularities in 
the terrain are important hurdles for state development, even after considering 
other determinants of state formation and progression such as elite domination, 
artificial states and regime type. 
The second essay, entitled ‘State Capacity: How to Mitigate the Adverse 
Consequences of Terrain Ruggedness?’, builds on the first essay and proposes 
some solutions to the negative consequences of terrain ruggedness on state 
capacity. Specifically, the essay explores whether or not the negative effects of 
topography can be alleviated through a denser road network, fiscal 
decentralisation and political autonomy. State capacity is again proxied by the 
aforementioned four latent variables. The results suggest that higher road 
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density increases the probability of collecting more taxes in rugged countries 
but also reduces the ability of the state to control inflation and to enforce rule 
of law. Fiscal decentralisation reduces the likelihood of high inflation and civil 
war in more rugged countries. Conversely, while political autonomy is 
associated with lower inflation, it leads to a higher probability of eruption of 
civil wars in more rugged countries. The policy implication of this research is 
to adopt fiscal decentralisation to alleviate the adverse effects of rugged 
topography, but it is emphasised that questions like the initial conditions that a 
country should attain before embarking on such reform need to be investigated 
prior to making a concrete policy prescription. 
The third essay, entitled ‘Empirically Testing the Persistence of Power, Elites 
and Institutions: Evidence from Land Reforms around the World, 1900–2010’ 
has a different focus. It empirically tests Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2008) 
predictions on the interactions of elites, political power and the adoption of 
pro-citizen economic policies in their paper, ‘Persistence of power, elites, and 
institutions’, in the American Economic Review (vol. 98, no. 1, pp. 267–93). 
By exploiting a novel dataset containing information about the number of 
enacted and implemented land reforms around the world over the twentieth 
century, the essay examines whether the elites maintain de facto political 
power over the citizens and whether de facto and de jure political powers have 
effects on economic policies that are supposedly beneficial for citizens. 
Specifically, the essay empirically tests whether (i) pro-citizen economic 
institutions are adopted when there is a broad political representation of the 
masses and elites are constrained (full democracy); (ii) pro-elite economic 
institutions are adopted when the political regime represents the interest of the 
elites (non-democracy); and (iii) pro-elite economic institutions are adopted 
when elites are able to exert power on the political system (de facto political 
power) even if the de jure political power represents the masses (captured 
democracy). The empirical part uses a panel dataset of 150 countries spanning 
from 1900 to 2010. The results indicate that trade openness, a proxy for pro-
citizen economic policy, is more likely to arise in countries with more 
democratic political regimes and where major land reforms have been enacted 
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or implemented. Additionally, trade openness is less likely to arise in countries 
with less democratic political regimes and where the elites are able to block the 
implementation of land reforms. The study further distinguishes among land 
reforms with different motives, and finds that it is more redistributive land 
reforms that lead to a higher likelihood for more pro-citizen economic policies. 
In order to mitigate the endogeneity problem arising from reverse causality, 
enacted and implemented land reforms are instrumented using the influence of 
the United States (US) on the country during the Cold War. Estimates using an 
instrumental variable (IV) strengthen the previous results. The essay concludes 
that Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2008) conjectures are consistent with data on 
land reform enactment and implementation and the associated implications for 
elite power. 
 
  
 
 Introduction Chapter 1:
1.1. Overview 
This thesis consists of three essays in the fields of political economy and 
development economics. Specifically, it aims to analyse two distinct but 
nevertheless connected phenomena: the role of physio-geography in state 
development, and the link between elite domination and the choice of pro-
citizen economic policies. The overarching theme across the two topics is the 
dynamics of inter-group cooperation and associated impediments for a higher 
collective welfare. 
The new political economy literature studies the problems arising in the 
political sphere through the lenses of traditional tools widespread in the 
economics literature. Currently, the field relies on analytical devices derived 
from rational choice, public choice, public finance and economic growth, as 
well as some of the newest developments in econometric techniques. 1  In 
mainstream economics, variables such as technology, institutional framework 
and societal structure are usually taken as exogenous. While this abstraction 
sometimes is a useful shortcut to demonstrate the impact of one variable or 
policy on a certain economic outcome (e.g. the effects of interest rates on 
consumer spending or the link between fiscal and monetary policy and long-
term inflation), it does not shed light on the reasons why a certain policy or 
technology is chosen over others. Precisely, the new political economy 
endogenises key variables such as institutions 2 , political framework and 
societal structure to study what determines these variables in first place. 
Indeed, this literature suggests that decision-makers or politicians are not 
benevolent and their decisions are balance out by their private incentives (e.g., 
holding office in the next term, seeking rents and getting personal favours) and 
public incentives (e.g., the electorate’s preferences, demographics and 
                                                 
1 Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Besley (2007) offer a summary of how the field has been 
progressing since its beginnings. 
2 Broadly, institutions can be defined as the human-made constraints that outline the interaction 
between the members of a society (North 1991).  
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country’s history. In a nutshell, political economy adds ‘political constraints’ to 
the economic problem. 
A relatively recent phenomenon within the field of political economy has been 
the growing interest in understanding the political economy side of the 
economic development process. Broadly, the idea is to comprehend the 
importance and role of political and economic institutions, and their 
determinants (e.g. initial income distribution, colonisation, geography, 
ethnicity, state structure, patrimonial rule, culture, social norms, cooperation 
and group heterogeneity) in shaping long-term economic and political 
outcomes.  
The idea that institutions are relevant for economic welfare is an important 
advance in the economics literature. North (1991, p. 97), who pioneered the 
study of institutions, posits, ‘institutions are the humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction’. An initial body of 
research aimed to determine which type of institutions matter and in which 
context. 3  Protection of property rights and rule of law were found to be 
examples of good economic institutions driving long-term investment and 
therefore economic growth (see Acemoglu & Johnson 2005; Knack & Keefer 
1995). 
In this vein, an area of growing interest is that of what drives the development 
of such institutions. The current scholarship offers many possibilities. 
Followers of the Coase theorem contend that collective choices can always 
bring about the most efficient outcome; the institution or decision that arises in 
a collective choice situation will be one that reflects the best outcome for the 
group and no other decision can better achieve this outcome. That is, any 
modification of the outcome decision will make at least one person worse off, 
relative to the benchmark outcome. 4  Otherwise, there would be room for 
bargaining such that the winners arising from the adoption of the efficient 
                                                 
3 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) describe a list of institutions that are important for 
long-term welfare. 
4 ‘Most efficient’ means the best outcome that a society can attain. Some societies may be 
aware of better institutions but may not be able to afford or implement them given prohibitive 
transaction costs.  
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institution will compensate the losers.5 However, this approach does not take 
into account the fact that the economic institutions are chosen by those holding 
political power—that there is a power imbalance embedded in the negotiating 
procedures in the first place—and therefore the decisions taken might favour 
those in power, making it possible for inefficient institutions to arise 
(Acemoglu 2003). This assertion is based on political scientists’ views about 
the persistent conflicts of interest between groups in a society.6 Effectively, 
societal conflict is at the core of current research in the political economy of 
development and as such, the topic opens up many research questions. For 
instance, what are the consequences of a fierce competition between different 
groups? What type of heterogeneity in groups matter for economic and 
political development? What are the origins of group heterogeneity? What are 
the strategies chosen by different groups to impose their views? What is the 
best way to encourage cooperation between heterogeneous groups? 
All these suggest that the role of history and path dependence is crucial in 
political economy. The framework is dynamic rather than static. History and, 
more specifically, historical accidents, are also used to explain the rise of 
different institutions and their impact on current outcomes.7 For instance, the 
length of the colonisation process, the identity of the coloniser, the waves of 
the colonisation process and the origins of the legal framework are major 
determinants of the institutional setting (Feyrer & Sacedorte 2009; La Porta et 
al. 1999; Olsson 2009). However, the question that remains is: why do initial 
institutions differ from one place to another even in cases where the coloniser 
was the same (or why were there similar institutions with different colonisers)? 
To answer that, it is necessary to introduce the specific context of where and 
when a certain institution arises. For instance, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) 
posit that differences in factor endowments in the Americas arising from 
geographical characteristics explain the observed variability of the institutional 
design. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) find that geography, through 
                                                 
5 See Coase (1960) and Stigler (1966). 
6 See Alesina and Drazen (1991), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) for early contributions. 
7 Nunn (2009) offers a review of the scholarship about history and economic development.  
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its impact on settler mortality, explains the variability in past institutions.8 
Nunn and Puga (2012) find that topography is the core variable to explain why 
some African countries suffered less from slavery.  
With this background in mind, the next subsection discusses the importance of 
geography in the making of current political and economic outcomes.  
1.2. Geography as a Driver of Long-term Economic 
and Political Development 
One recent area of research gaining momentum is the role of geography and its 
interaction with history within the political economy context and how this 
interaction can underlie the development and the nature of institutions that, in 
turn, shape and influence economic and welfare outcomes. Stasavage (2010) 
demonstrates that small European polities were more likely to have more 
representative institutions than larger countries in medieval times, given that 
travel costs were significantly lower in small countries allowing assemblies to 
meet more frequently. Thus, assemblies could monitor public finances more 
closely and the public were keener to pay taxes, augmenting the state capacity 
to obtain revenue. Similarly, Berkowitz and Clay (2011) find that rainfall and 
distance to rivers and lakes explain past levels of political competition within 
the states in the United States (US). Following a sequential approach, these 
authors determine that past levels of political competition explain current 
levels of political competition, which in turn, explain the degree of 
independence of the state courts. The final outcome is that the more 
independent the judiciary from political parties, the higher income per capita.  
In political economy terms, the link between history and current outcomes is 
known as persistence. Within a dynamic game setting, Lagunoff (2009) 
demonstrates that the set of institutions available at time t are a function of the 
institution chosen at time t-1. In other words, once an institution is chosen, it 
creates path dependence. Dell (2010) offers empirical evidence showing that 
                                                 
8  Hall and Jones (1999) find that the economic institutions and government regulations, 
summarised as an index of social index, is partially explained by distance from the equator. 
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there is a relationship between Peru’s topography, adoption of past inefficient 
economic institutions during the Spanish colonisation and its current 
development outcomes. She shows that regions where Spanish colonisers 
imposed a coercive labour system called mita 9  present lower levels of 
development today relative to boundary regions that were not affected by this 
system. Yet, institutions are not the only mechanisms through which history 
and geography could have long-lasting effects. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) 
show that countries whose ethnic groups were more affected by the slave trade 
present higher contemporaneous levels of mistrust.10 Alesina, Giuliano and 
Nunn (2013) present evidence relating the type of terrain suitable for different 
types of crops, the corresponding adoption of traditional agriculture methods in 
the pre-industrial era (plough cultivation vs. shifting cultivation) and current 
beliefs about gender roles. Thus, places where the plough was the most suitable 
form of agricultural production for the terrain show greater gender inequality 
beliefs and less female participation in the labour market and in politics today. 
Hence, persistence could also be the product of culture, norms and beliefs, 
which were, in turn, driven by geographically influenced historical paths. 
Although geography is currently studied together with history and as a 
determinant of initial institutions, it is important to note that it also plays a role 
by itself as a determinant of economic and political outcomes. Gallup, Sachs 
and Mellinger (1999) provide evidence that geographical distance from core 
markets and being a landlocked country are important determinants of 
transportation costs and hence income levels. Additionally, they find that 
countries with tropical climates suffer a higher disease burden than countries 
with temperate climates, which reduces labour productivity. 11  Finally, they 
posit that the market value of agricultural production correlates negatively with 
every increase in average temperature recorded (see Sachs & Warner 1997, 
Landes 1999 and Mellinger, Sachs & Gallup 2000). In the same line of 
                                                 
9 The highly rugged topography of these regions made it impossible for the natives to escape 
from the brutal Spanish colonisers.  
10 Interestingly, Nunn and Puga (2012) uncover that the number of slaves caught were linked 
directly to the level of terrain ruggedness observed in a specific geographic area. 
11 A higher disease burden could also affect economic outcomes through fertility. In fact, high 
child mortality makes parents keener to have more children as an insurance factor in case one 
child dies, thereby keeping the country in a Malthusian poverty trap (Strulik 2008).  
C H A P T E R  O N E  
6 
 
argument, Diamond (1997) explains the role of physical geography and 
ecology for the early rise of agricultural production that facilitated the 
transition from hunting and gathering societies to sedentary societies, opening 
the door for technological progress. Olsson and Hibs (2005) provide empirical 
support for Diamond’s view and conclude that current variations in economic 
income are also strongly determined by measures of physio-geography and 
biogeography. 
The political science literature also makes use of geographic features to explain 
some political outcomes. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that a higher presence 
of mountains is associated with the presence of civil conflicts. This does not 
mean that countries with more mountains are more prone to civil conflict. On 
the contrary, their study shows that geography sometimes makes it more 
difficult for the state to control its territory effectively and a mountainous 
terrain can pose many challenges to conflict resolution in cases of civil 
tensions. 12  Moreover, Herbst (2000) elucidates qualitatively that African 
topography and ecology are not conducive to consolidation of power, and 
therefore earlier African rulers or colonisers were not able to implement a 
hierarchical state that could control their territory and enforce rules. This 
failure translates into current weak states plagued with civil violence, low 
provision of public goods and lack of revenue from taxation.  
1.2.1. Geography and the State 
A new, but still infant, body of research in political science and political 
development aims to understand the causes and consequences of weak states 
(see Acemoglu 2005, Acemoglu et al. 2011 and Besley & Persson 2010). 
Besley and Persson (2009) find that political stability and cohesive political 
institutions are important determinants of state capacity, measured as the fiscal 
capability to raise tax and the legal endowment to enforce property rights. 
Moreover, Dincecco and Prado (2012) show that pre-modern wars greatly 
explain current fiscal state capacity.  
                                                 
12 Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) find that topography and distance are directly linked to the 
duration of civil conflicts. 
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An important gap in this research is that these studies do not explain the role of 
topographic characteristics in determining the current behaviour of the state. 
Following Herbst’s (2000) reasoning, one might expect that topography plays a 
role for the projection of power, and therefore, for developing an efficient 
central authority, the modern state. Therefore, the first essay in this thesis 
attempts to answer empirically whether terrain ruggedness, an exogenous 
factor, is a root determinant for state capacity outcomes today.  
The results robustly show that terrain ruggedness plays a negative role for 
current state capacity. They also identify early urbanisation as a mechanism 
through which this exogenous effect works. Thus, it is shown that terrain 
ruggedness affects the outcomes of state capacity not only directly, but also 
indirectly through certain channels. The essay does not answer, however, if 
topography matters for any specific political or economic institution.  
Given the findings in the first essay, the second essay focuses on whether or 
not devices or arrangements that optimally reduce transaction costs and foster 
inter-group cooperation can be used to overcome the topographical challenges 
generated by rugged terrain. Within the context of a literature that has often 
raised concerns with respect to the use of pure geographic arguments for 
explaining political and economic outcomes (labelled ‘geographical 
determinism’), this essay explores if man-made factors that interact with 
geographic features can explain their importance in influencing political 
outcomes. Specifically, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), Easterly and 
Levine (2003), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) assert that 
geography has an impact on economic welfare when it interacts with 
institutions. While this observation is important, the inclusion of variables 
capturing the interaction of institutions with geography does not entirely wipe 
out the statistical significance of the direct effect of geographic variables from 
the econometric analysis. For instance, distance to the equator or latitude is still 
found to be a significant determinant in almost all cross-country analyses 
trying to explain differences in development outcomes, regardless of whether 
institutional variables are included in the explanatory variables.  
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Sachs (2001) argues that there is no need to fight for or against any of these 
views and that it is more important to find solutions to specific problems 
arising from having certain geographic characteristics; solutions such as 
discovering an effective vaccine against malaria or better ways to connect the 
hinterland to coastal areas. Even if researchers find a vaccine or if roads are 
built, the geographic burden will still be present and with it an ongoing cost.  
Nevertheless, it is not only technology that could help to overcome negative 
effects of geography. If rugged terrain increases transaction costs and reduces 
inter-group cooperation, then the answer to surmount this problem might lie in 
finding the right institutions or devices to increase the yields of inter-group 
cooperation. 
In essence, the second essay of this thesis tries to provide an answer to the 
question of whether there are specific economic or political arrangements that 
could help mitigate the negative effect of topography for building a capable 
modern state, and if there are, what would they be? One of the main challenges 
caused by terrain ruggedness is that it prevents authorities from projecting 
power from the centre to the periphery and increases the transaction costs of 
cooperation. From history, monarchs, kings, dictators and democratically 
elected presidents have built roads aiming to broadcast power to the hinterland 
and thus to gain control over that territory. Thus, if there would be a device that 
can serve as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs and promote cooperation 
between citizens, building roads is an option to consider (Agenor 2010).  
A challenging topography can also physically isolate different groups and 
create disengagement between the citizens and the state authorities, which 
could create tension and lead to a weak state apparatus. As a way to diminish 
this divergence and to avoid secession, Alesina (2003) emphasises that sharing 
power between groups located in different areas could overcome otherwise 
negative potential outcomes such as civil wars. Traditionally, there are two 
ways of embarking on such a situation (i.e. sharing fiscal responsibilities 
between different levels of government and sharing political power between 
regions). Thus this essay asks, if in addition to a denser road network, fiscal 
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decentralisation and political autonomy might mitigate the negative effect of 
terrain ruggedness on state capacity. 
While the results for political autonomy and higher road density are mixed, the 
results for fiscal decentralisation are more concrete. The findings suggest that 
fiscal decentralisation reduces the negative effect of terrain ruggedness for 
some state capabilities in more rugged countries. 
Although some of these findings are appealing from a policy perspective, the 
essay does not provide insights into how to implement reforms or whether to 
adopt certain economic policies over others. On the contrary, its objective is far 
from providing a one-size-fits-all solution to rugged countries with weak state 
apparatus. One caveat of the essay is that it treats fiscal and political 
decentralisation as exogenous variables as it does not attempt to determine the 
drivers of these policies. Thus, any suggestion or advocacy for policy reform 
should first try to understand what brings about fiscal or political 
decentralisation in the first place as well as what the consequences of adopting 
such policies are. 
1.3. Societal Conflict and the Political Economy of 
Development 
If the solutions to problems of state capacity lie in the structure of the political 
system, it is important to understand how political systems develop and evolve, 
whom they serve and how they can be influenced and leveraged for economic 
development policy. Indeed, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) point to the 
necessity of a broader understanding of the distributional effects of adopting 
certain economic policies in order to avoid strengthening the position of 
already powerful groups, which usually results in poorer development 
outcomes. Thus, an emerging body of research attempts to understand the role 
of elites in the development process.  
The study of elites takes as its foundations the premise that different groups 
have different preferences about certain economic policies. This societal 
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conflict point of view is central in the fields of political science and political 
economy. Many studies have shown the strong explanatory power of societal 
heterogeneity for certain outcomes. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) 
demonstrate that the degree of ethnic heterogeneity within a geographic 
location matters for the level and nature of provision of public goods. Alesina 
et al. (2003) develop different measures of heterogeneity such as 
fractionalisation based on language, religion and ethnicity, and conclude that 
these variables are important explanatory variables for economic, social and 
political development.13  
Theoretical models of power relations in the political economy literature are 
based on the premise that there are two types of groups in a society: elites and 
citizens. In these models, typically the elites hold office and maximise the 
returns from adopting certain policies at the expense of the citizens. For 
instance, powerful elites might choose to develop a weak state to escape 
present and future taxation in case they lose power and the citizens demand 
higher levels of tax collection and enforcement from the wealthy in society 
(Acemoglu, Ticchi & Vindigni 2011). They might also invest in militias to 
influence elections (Acemoglu, Ticchi & Vindigni 2010) or simply support 
dictatorial regimes that make decisions in their favour.14 
If the distribution of political power is important for the determination of 
economic policies, how is the political power attributed? Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008) hypothesise that it can be designated in two ways. The first is 
referred to as de jure political power, which is linked to the power granted by 
formal political institutions (i.e. constitution, laws, political regime) and the 
second is called de facto political power, which stems from informal 
institutions and truly reflects the power that is held in practice by groups that 
                                                 
13  See also Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2012), 
Desmet, Weber and Ortuño-Ortín (2009), Fearon (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005). 
14  These theoretical models simplify the complex phenomenon of societal conflict. For 
instance, a new emerging elite might try to destroy the old elite and gain power by forming a 
coalition with the citizens, and new political and economic policies could be the result of the 
bargaining process. In this chapter, we abstract from these complexities and treat societal 
conflict as the permanent struggle between elites and citizens in line with Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s (2008) views. 
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are not always those that are in office (e.g. militia, businessmen clubs, 
landlords and warlords). These two types of political power and their 
interaction are the main determinants, according to Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2008), of economic policies. Despite this important claim, this hypothesis has 
not been tested using data. Therefore, the third essay of this thesis aims to 
investigate the link between these measures and economic choices.  
The main contribution of this essay resides, specifically, in exploiting a 
variable that captures the power of the elites. It is proposed that the holding and 
maintenance of productive assets in the economy—land in most cases, 
particularly throughout history—is an important indicator of whether or not the 
asset-owning elites hold power and maintain it over time. The important test of 
whether or not changes in de jure power are echoed by changes in de facto 
power when political reform is said to take place is whether or not the 
concentrated ownership of productive assets that reflects the concentration of 
political and economic power has also transferred to a broader population base. 
To undertake this investigation, a unique dataset containing the enactment and 
implementation of land reforms over the last century is refined and employed. 
The idea is that, as land represents the economic power, powerful elites will 
resist the enactment of land reforms. Where this resistance is ineffectual (or 
deemed to be politically destabilising, which in itself poses a risk to economic 
power holdings), elites may choose to agree to the enactment of the land 
reforms while covertly planning to suppress their implementation in actuality. 
Thus, land reforms may be initiated on paper but never realised due to the 
mitigation of the movement by the elites in the long term. The advantage for 
the elites in agreeing to the enactment of land reform is that they can give the 
impression of being pro-reform and thus quell any groundswell of political 
instability that may result from full resistance to redistributive reform. They 
can also dissipate the critical political impetus generated by the pro-citizen 
reformers and may thus have a better chance at blocking the implementation. 
Thus the hypothesis is that where the elites maintain control over land 
resources, they also maintain control over the political system, even if the 
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system itself is, at least on paper, reformed to accommodate a more pro-citizen 
approach. Accordingly, the essay tests whether or not countries that are 
supposedly democratic (i.e. support a democratic election process) are 
effectively democratic in the sense that they are representative of the broad 
electorate, in reality. Specifically, countries that are deemed to be de jure 
democratic, which have enacted and implemented land reforms that are pro-
citizen since their democratisation, are also determined to be de facto 
democratic. Conversely, those who have made the move to democracy on 
paper but have maintained the more feudal composition of productive asset 
holdings are deemed by this study to be only de jure, but not de facto, 
democratic. The results of the essay show that once the elites have been 
defeated, the economic choice is in line with citizens’ preferences and the 
political system is both de jure and de facto democratic. In this sense, countries 
that have achieved full democratisation have managed to constrain the 
otherwise disproportionate power of the elite and, as a result, are able to 
undertake economic policies that are more in line with long-term development 
objectives. 
To conclude, the thesis analyses the role of two main factors that thwart inter-
group cooperation and reduces the collective output of societies with 
consequences for long-run development, namely physio-geography and elite 
domination of political systems. The results show that terrain ruggedness 
hinders the development of state capacity through an increase in transaction 
costs, and that pro-citizen economic policies are more likely to arise in 
countries where the masses have been able to constrain the power of the elites. 
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 What Underlies Weak States? The Chapter 2:
Role of Terrain Ruggedness 
2.1. Introduction 
There is a resurgent and growing debate in the literature on the role of the state 
machinery in promoting economic development (Besley & Persson 2011a). In 
contrast to earlier debates that focus on the appropriate level of government 
intervention, current discussions centre on the questions of what constitutes an 
effective state apparatus and why inefficient states emerge and persist 
(Acemoglu, Ticchi & Vindigni 2011). This essay concentrates on the 
underlying foundations for effective states, and asks: what are the impediments 
to the development and sustainability of state capacity? The essay argues that 
obstacles for collective action are important hurdles to state formation and 
progression. In particular, rough topography, as a barrier to cooperation, is a 
fundamental factor in the early development of effective states and is, in turn, 
an important predictor of state capacity today. 
One strand of research addressing state formation recognises that a state is 
formed by a group of citizens sharing common interests aiming to satisfy their 
particular needs. In particular, agents form coalitions to overcome a common 
enemy or a problem when the benefits of creating such a group are greater than 
the benefits of acting alone. Cooperation among the state’s constituents is 
needed, not only for forming the state, but also to increase its capacity over 
time. In this sense, state formation and development is an outcome of 
collective action (Blanton & Fargher 2008; Levi 1989; Olson 1971).1 
The recent economics literature defines state capacity as the ability to tax 
effectively and provide growth-enhancing public goods. These functions and 
                                                 
1 Collective action is not the only factor underlying state formation. Other theories emphasise, 
for instance, the role of war in making modern states (Tilly 1992), elite domination (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2008) or colonisation (Olson 2009). However, even under those circumstances, 
rugged terrain might affect the collective behaviour needed for state capacity to improve over 
time through greater transaction costs. These theories are revisited in Sections 2.2 and 2.5.2. 
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competencies of the state promote economic development and welfare 
distribution (Acemoglu 2005; Besley 2011; Besley & Persson 2009; 2010; 
2011a; 2011b). The political science literature places more emphasis on the 
state being the provider of the rule of law and the host of political institutions. 
Importantly, both fields hold the common view that all the state’s economic 
and political functions are tightly connected and society’s inability to invest in 
them will result in lost tax revenue, reduced provision of public goods, 
diminished rule of law, and feeble political institutions. 
If state capacity is vital for increasing welfare, then what determines its 
initiation, evolution and persistence? Instead of focusing on the achievement of 
a capable state apparatus in its completeness, this essay re-focuses on the 
underlying factors behind the collective action problem in the first place. The 
core argument here is that impediments to collective action, and the extent to 
which they can be addressed, will determine where a state falls in the state 
capacity ‘spectrum’ and can explain the efficacy of the state machinery today.2 
Accordingly, the essay empirically investigates the role of terrain ruggedness, a 
core factor that features as a major obstacle for collective action. The argument 
is that because the ruggedness of the terrain increases the costs of 
cooperation—by raising transaction costs—and reduces the benefits of 
collective action, the more prevalent this characteristic is within a country, the 
weaker the state apparatus is likely to be. Terrain ruggedness presents 
considerable challenges for the provision of public goods, not only by 
constituting a physical obstacle to infrastructure development, but also by 
restricting congregation, communication and interaction. The latter are keys to 
collective action agreement and critically shaped the capacity and effectiveness 
of early institutions. Nunn and Puga (2012), Berkowitz and Clay (2011), Dell 
(2010), Stasavage (2010), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), and Easterly and 
Levine (2003) illustrate that geographical conditions crucially affect the quality 
                                                 
2 Indeed, Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) posit that the degree of cooperation between 
citizens might be an outcome of institutions rather than the other way around. To avoid the 
reverse causality problem, the main independent variable in this study is terrain ruggedness 
index which captures the difficulties of cooperation and is totally exogenous to political 
institutions. 
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of initial institutions and the availability of future policy options. For instance, 
Stasavage (2010), focusing on European state formation for the period 1250 to 
1750, shows that smaller and compact polities were able to develop political 
institutions with broad representation because nominated authorities were able 
to meet more frequently to invigilate state finances. 
The terrain ruggedness measure—originally constructed by Riley, DeGloria 
and Elliot (1999) and later updated and improved by Nunn and Puga (2012)—
precisely quantifies topographic irregularities in a country’s land area. Based 
on digital elevation data taken from the Global 30-arc second elevation data 
(GTOPO30), a global dataset developed through international collaboration led 
by the US Geological Survey Center, it accurately measures topographic 
characteristics of a certain geographical area by using satellite images. 
Elevation observations in GTOPO30 are regularly spaced at 30 arc-seconds 
(926 meters) across the entire surface of the Earth, thus facilitating a fine 
measure of terrain characteristics (Nunn & Puga 2012). This degree of 
precision for the terrain structure captures the proximate conditions that affect 
collective behaviour among different human groups and the costs of 
cooperation arising from geographic constraints. That is, only fine grid 
measurements of the Earth’s surface can allow quantification of the collusion 
costs of topographic disturbances. For instance, settlements that lie on different 
sides of hills or in different altitudes within a short span are likely to face non-
negligible costs of communication and cooperation. Simple distance variables 
like ‘as-the-crow-flies’ measures, or indicators reflecting larger scale 
irregularities such as the percentage of mountains in a country’s surface area, 
are too crude to capture this type of settlement dispersion and the associated 
costs of inter-group cooperation.3 
The focus on terrain ruggedness also parallels Nunn and Puga (2012), who 
show, somewhat surprisingly, that rugged topography reduced the severe 
effects of the slave trade in Africa, given the difficulties associated with 
‘recruiting’ slaves in such terrain. The argument in this essay is predicated on a 
                                                 
3 Topographic heterogeneity may significantly underlie the spatial choice of early settlements, 
but this does not change the thrust of the main argument. 
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similar, but contrasting (from the outcome’s point of view), logic—rugged 
terrain makes it more difficult for different groups to cooperate. An implied 
competing hypothesis, nonetheless, is that terrain ruggedness can result in 
highly densely populated areas, and that people in these locations can 
congregate and cooperate more easily. The net effect of terrain ruggedness 
under these circumstances is an empirical question. 
Another distinctive contribution of this essay is methodological: the treatment 
of state capacity as a latent variable. Despite the broad agreement on the state 
as a crucial platform upon which to build and implement welfare-enhancing 
policies, there is little consensus as to how to measure its effectiveness and 
compare its performance across countries. Besley and Persson (2009) argue 
that the empirics of state capacity are complex, as states perform a myriad of 
functions. The main estimation problem is that the level of state capacity is not 
observable; researchers observe only its outcomes. Therefore, we utilise the 
latent variable model, which, from a statistical point of view, captures perfectly 
the state capacity concept described above. Specifically, the index function 
underlying the latent variable model moderates the probability of a state being 
weak or strong in the ‘spectrum’ of states, given the explanatory variables, 
where the relevant outcome is observed once a threshold is exceeded. 
The outcome variables to measure state capacity here are inflation, rule of law, 
share of tax revenue in gross domestic product (GDP), and presence of civil 
war. It must be stressed that these outcomes are not some simple measures of 
economic or political performance; rather, they closely represent the symptoms 
of strong versus weak states. They are also tightly linked to cooperation in 
collective action and thus clearly indicate a state’s ability to perform its 
functions over time. 
Given this background, we exploit a sizeable variation in topographic features 
and state performance exhibited by countries around the globe, which permits a 
useful empirical leverage to assess the hypothesised relationship. After 
demonstrating the direct predictive power of terrain ruggedness on state 
capacity, we explore one specific channel through which the related force 
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variable may matter: early urbanisation. The central reasoning here is that 
urbanised societies are more likely to have solved their tax collection problem 
earlier and have better infrastructure and connectivity. This reasoning implies 
that terrain ruggedness may delay urbanisation and subsequently reduce state 
capacity.  
The findings of this study show that terrain ruggedness robustly predicts state 
capacity today, both directly and through the hypothesised channel, with 
meaningful and consistent marginal effects across an array of models. Further, 
we also find that its effect on state capacity is non-linear, suggesting that 
countries may try to overcome its negative effects, but after a certain point, 
ruggedness becomes inhibiting and starts exerting its negative influence. Our 
results are robust to account for alternative mechanisms that might explain 
state formation (e.g. elite presence, artificial states) and to control for possible 
spatial spillovers of state fragility among neighbouring countries. 
2.2. The State and the Collective Action Problem 
In his seminal book, Olson (1971) theorises that the state is formed by a group 
of citizens sharing common interests aiming to satisfy their particular needs. 
Hence, the origin of the state is explained by cooperation in collective action. 
Levi (1989) posits that agents form groups or coalitions to overcome a 
common enemy or problem when the benefits of creating such a group are 
greater than the benefits of acting alone.4 Maintenance of the state also requires 
that the benefits of and incentives for cooperation are preserved over time. 
Accordingly, an organisational structure that deters the formation of internal 
factions (e.g. through a ‘Weberian monopoly of violence’) and distributes the 
benefits of collective action is integral to the sustenance of the state. The size 
of the coalition can also affect state capacity because incentives to cooperate 
are reduced as the coalition increases in size due to the free-rider problem 
                                                 
4 Using archaeological data, Blanton and Fargher (2008) find evidence that even rulers of pre-
modern states provided public goods in exchange for different types of income from taxpayers 
in complex societies such as Egypt, the Aztecs, China and Ancient Greece.  
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(Olson 1971). Collective action theory thus highlights common interests and 
incentives for cooperation as keys to state formation and persistence. 
Another theory explaining state formation is based on external wars (Tilly 
1992). The core argument is that modern states emerge as a consequence of 
military competition. Since fighting wars need vast resources, state 
bureaucratisation was seen as a more efficient and sophisticated way of 
organising resource extraction than relying on local elites. Under this theory, 
collective action is not seen as a main determinant of state formation. 
However, the military approach does not rule out that cooperation improves 
state progression, in which case collective action, though not explaining why a 
state is formed, might explain the development of state capacity. Similarly, 
even if a society begins with elite domination of the political scene in which 
citizens are only inactive players (see Acemoglu & Robinson 2008), or even if 
the colonial powers left a state structure behind to start off with, collective 
action is needed to improve state capacity over time and ensure its survival. 
2.2.1. What is State Capacity? 
State capacity is perhaps best defined by its antithesis. The political science 
literature refers to ‘fragile states’ or ‘weak states’ as those that are unable to 
provide basic public goods, effectively exert control over their territory, 
commit to a policy or enforce the rule of law (Fukuyama 2011). In economics, 
the concept is more commonly related to the capacity to raise taxes and provide 
public goods. Acemoglu (2005) defines weak states as those that cannot tax 
and regulate the economy or deal efficiently with non-state actors. Regardless 
of whether the perspective is from political science or economics, weak states 
do not produce outputs in line with their citizens’ long-term welfare.  
It is also important to differentiate state capacity from political regime. A state 
with a democratic regime might be weak, while a more dictatorial regime may 
have a stronger state. Moreover, the lack of state capacity is not unique to poor 
or developing countries. For instance, the recent explosion of social violence in 
Bahrain, which has one of the highest incomes per capita in the Gulf, is an 
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example of a country where high income and social unrest can co-exist. 
Further, the extent to which differences in political systems explain different 
levels of state capacity is not clear. Both consolidated democracies and 
nondemocratic states face problems related to legitimisation of the state. For 
instance, fierce political confrontation between fractionalised elites is at the 
heart of the Belgian disintegration debate. In summary, despite being related, 
political regimes and state capacity are distinct phenomena.5 
2.2.2. Terrain Ruggedness as an Impediment to Cooperation in 
Collective Action 
The simplest framework to illustrate a collective action problem is a static 
game, where the predicted Nash equilibrium generates a socially inefficient 
outcome if players do not cooperate.6 Theoretical models mostly rely on social 
norms, reciprocity and trust to explain how the socially efficient equilibrium 
can emerge. 
In this strand of research, an important predictor of cooperation within a group 
is transaction costs. North (1991) emphasises that higher transaction costs can 
offset the gains from cooperation, even in settings where all individuals want to 
cooperate. North describes situations where societies facing higher transaction 
costs are more likely to remain idle or even decline, while those facing lower 
transaction costs will progress over time. Olson (1971, pp. 46–7) argues that: 
Any group that must organize to obtain a collective good will find 
that it has a certain minimum organization cost that must be met ... 
The organizational costs include the costs of communication among 
group members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the 
costs of creating, staffing, and maintaining any formal group 
organization. 
                                                 
5 Fragile states also differ from failed states such as Somalia or Sudan, where neither security 
nor justice is delivered by the state. A fragile state could become a failed state (Collier 2009). 
6 Examples of such games are Tragedy of the Commons and Stag Hunt (Binmore 2007).  
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Then the question is: what determines transaction costs? Physio-geography is 
clearly a non-trivial source of transaction costs. Early societies, in particular, 
confronted substantial constraints and prohibitive costs due to geographical 
features. 7  Nunn and Puga (2012) explain that terrain ruggedness makes 
transportation and construction costly, reduces profits for agriculture, and is 
negatively related to income per capita. The provision of rule of law also 
requires not only enacting laws and codes, but also monitoring and enforcing 
them and, for that, the state needs to establish courts and maintain their 
operation. Organisational costs of such operations are higher in settings 
characterised by difficult topography. 
Along these lines, several World Bank reports for Latin America argue that 
rugged terrain imposes serious constraints on the region due to difficulties 
associated with the delivery of infrastructure and basic services (World Bank 
2009).8 In addition, Dell (2010) documents the persistent negative effects of 
past institutions, designed on the basis of terrain ruggedness, on current levels 
of consumption in Peru. The mita, an institution characterised by a forced 
labour system in silver mines, was imposed by the Spanish colonisers only in 
places surrounded by mountains, so that the native population could not 
escape. Dell demonstrates that current consumption is 25 per cent lower in 
areas where mita was in place. She illustrates how physio-geography can have 
persistent effects on current levels of development. Extending this reasoning to 
state capacity, rugged terrain can increase transaction costs, deterring 
cooperation for the provision of public goods.9 
Another strand in the literature highlights the role of terrain ruggedness in civil 
conflicts. It is well known that mountainous topography increases the 
likelihood or duration of civil war by providing rebels with advantage and 
                                                 
7 Stasavage (2010, p. 628) cites several sources on how tough geography led to absenteeism in 
assembly meetings or complaints by assembly members about prohibitive travel costs in early 
European polities. 
8  Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2007) find that landlocked countries, which are generally 
mountainous, exhibit higher inequality between rural and urban educational attainment due to 
difficulties associated with public service delivery to rural areas. 
9 Topography can also impede private sector development, which can in turn affect the demand 
for infrastructure or the ‘supply of tax revenues’. In our analysis this issue is addressed by 
controlling for the size of government (‘1 - private sector size’) where appropriate. 
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negatively affecting military operations (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009; Fearon 
& Laitin 2003). Examples relating to Colombia, Algeria, Peru, Cuba and 
Afghanistan are well documented (Acemoglu, Ticchi & Vindigni 2010; 
Arreguín-Toft 2001).10  
A final aspect of rugged topography is that its negative consequences can be 
alleviated, if not reversed, through engineering. A case in point is Switzerland. 
Though not all rugged countries are as successful as this country, it is 
reasonable to expect that an average country would try to overcome certain 
forms of ruggedness. Further, some levels of ruggedness may provide certain 
advantages over a smoother terrain (e.g. productivity of certain crops), or 
spatial segregation may motivate cooperation among settlements up to some 
level of topographic difficulty (e.g. sharing a river or building a road for 
common use). All of these imply that adverse consequences of ruggedness may 
start being observed after a point, in which case ruggedness may exert a non-
linear influence on state capacity. 
2.2.3. Inability to Commit 
Another dimension of a state’s strength is its ability to commit. This 
commitment is often required for implementing policies that concern a broad 
cross-section of the public. This requires first a broad agreement on the part of 
the constituents about the policy, and second, cooperation for the 
implementation and maintenance of the policy. Inability to commit is a 
particularly observable, but not directly measurable, symptom of a weak state. 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009, p. 46) argue that fragile states, or, in their 
definition, the natural state, ‘has a limited ability to make commitments about 
the future’. By contrast, modern states have a complete set of rules and 
constraints that allow them to make credible long-term commitments. In the 
theory of conflicts, credibility is embedded in pacts. Usually, pacts in modern 
states are enduring, because associated laws, institutions, separation of powers, 
                                                 
10  Similarly, Herbst (2000) argues that colonisers conquered territories to the extent that 
benefits from expansion did not offset the costs. 
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and checks and balances make the pacts credible. For example, Uganda has 
experienced more than six civil internal wars in the last 40 years. After each 
dispute is settled, a new one emerges because parties involved in the conflict 
cannot make credible commitments, and break the ‘pacts’.11 
An obvious sphere in which to observe the inability to commit is unstable 
monetary and fiscal policies that lead to inflationary pressures. It is generally 
agreed that rulers have strong incentives to increase short-term employment by 
fuelling the economy with money. This, in turn, influences future expectations 
about inflation, creating a dynamic inconsistency problem. To avoid such a 
dilemma, the institutional framework must generate correct incentives to 
governments and central bankers to adopt credible policies (Blinder et al. 
2008). Thus, a state that is able to commit to a sustained monetary policy 
would produce a low inflation rate over time. Inability to commit to policies 
expands also into areas such as fiscal policy, debt management, and even 
deterrence. 
2.3. Data and Methodology 
As noted earlier, the concept of state capacity transcends income, political 
systems, colonialism and geographic location. Given the multidimensionality 
and complexity of the topic, it is difficult to separate the causes and 
consequences of state fragility. Besley and Persson (2010) state that some 
indexes used to measure state fragility mix causes and symptoms and, 
therefore, using such indexes to derive statistical inferences attracts strong 
reservations. Since state capacity cannot be observed directly, it is not 
advisable to use traditional statistical tools to make inferences. However, 
researchers can observe its outcomes, such as civil conflict, inflation and the 
size of the underground economy. Thus, state capacity fits the definition of a 
latent variable and, so, can be analysed using a latent variable model. One can 
analyse whether a state possesses a weak or strong capability through an index 
                                                 
11 Acemoglu (2005) states that, in consensually strong states, it is the credibility of the state’s 
commitment to redistribution policy that allows for higher taxation. 
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function with appropriate manifest variables, where, with suitable indicators of 
state fragility, the index function would be β0+ β1TRI, moderating the 
probability of a weak state occurring if the threshold 0.5 is exceeded. 
Therefore, the index function captures, usefully, the underlying mechanism 
that leads to the observed outcome, either high-type or low-type (i.e. strong or 
weak state capacity). A clear alternative is the continuous treatment of state 
capacity indicators and, hence, a linear estimation. The implications of this 
choice are checked in Appendix A1.12 An additional econometric difficulty is 
the inability to observe collective action itself. While its determinants and 
outcomes are known, it is difficult to summarise collective action in a variable. 
Consequently, our latent variable model takes a reduced form. 
Formally, 
௜ܻ
כ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܺ௜ ൅ ߝ௜ሺͳሻ 
Where ௜ܻכ is the latent variable representing state capacity, ܺ௜ are the manifest 
variables, and ߝ௜ is the error term. ௜ܻכ is defined as follows: 
௜ܻ ൌ ൜ͳǡ ݂݅ ௜ܻ
כ ൐ ܻכതതത
Ͳǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ሺʹሻ
where Y has the following probability: 
ሺ ௜ܻ ൌ ͳȁܺ௜ሻ ൌ Ȱሺߚܺ௜ሻሺ͵ሻ 
which we estimate with a logit model.13 
To test our principal hypothesis that terrain ruggedness impedes cooperation in 
collective action and reduces state capacity, we estimate the following index 
function: 
௜ܻ
כ ൌ ݂ሺݐ݁ݎݎܽ݅݊ݎݑ݃݃݁݀݊݁ݏݏ௜ሺܴܶܫሻǡ ܼ௜ሻሺͶሻ 
                                                 
12 For instance, an extra mountain contributing to state capacity by X per cent is a difficult 
inference to make. 
13 Only the average marginal effects are presented here. Logit estimates are available upon 
request. 
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where ௜ܻכ captures state capacity for country i, and Z is a vector of controls as 
discussed below. This essay utilises four indicators to measure ௜ܻכ : (i) the 
average inflation rate over the period 1960 to 2009, (ii) the rule of law 
averaged over the period 1996 to 2010, (iii) tax revenue/GDP averaged over 
the period 1990 to 2009, and (iv) the presence of civil war over the period 1975 
to 2010. 
Specifically, if average inflation over the 50-year period exceeds a certain 
threshold, this signals the state’s inability to commit to policies. The benefit of 
using inflation as a proxy for state capacity is three-fold. First, it is a good 
proxy for the commitment to stable monetary and fiscal policy. North, Wallis 
and Weingast (2009) argue that many weak states have experienced periods of 
high inflation due to self-imbalances that have not been addressed properly. 
Second, weak states frequently resort to inflation tax (Besley & Persson 2009; 
2010; Levi 1989; Tilly 1992). Third, inflation is a public good. When inflation 
is low, relative prices are more stable and hence individuals and firms face less 
uncertainty. 
We use a 10 per cent inflation rate as the threshold to construct the latent 
variable indicator. While sensitivity to this threshold is tested to check for 
robustness, 10 per cent appears to represent a well-accepted figure. 14 
Essentially, while moderate inflation may be acceptable over growth periods, 
no country with stable monetary and fiscal policy would score an average 
inflation rate higher than 10 per cent over a 50-year period. 
The second state capacity indicator is the rule of law and is obtained from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) 
posit that the rule of law is characterised by credible commitments between all 
members of a society, including rulers and citizens. The concept has two main 
components: (i) the state provides protection to its citizens from the abuse of 
other citizens, and (ii) the state prevents itself from behaving in a predatory 
manner towards its constituents. Thus, the rule of law is a public good. Given 
                                                 
14 Fischer (1996) emphasises that double-digit figures of inflation are unfavourable for growth. 
Khan and Senhadji (2001) find that an inflation rate above 11 per cent is harmful to growth in 
developing countries. 
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the way this index is constructed, the mean value, 0, is adopted as the threshold 
for the latent variable. 
The third indicator is tax revenue as proportion of GDP, following the 
reasoning of Levi (1989) and Tilly (1992). Tax collection is a broader measure 
of state capacity, indicating the extent to which the state can extract revenue 
from its constituents and enforce tax legislation and tax compliance. This 
indicator also signals the scope of the state; minimalistic states would prefer to 
have lower taxes than interventionist states. Note, however, that minimalistic 
states should not be confused with weak states.15 We use a threshold level of 
15 per cent, a figure close to the mean observed in the sample. A threshold 
level of 17 per cent is also used to check robustness. 
The last indicator is the presence of civil war, taken from the Upssala Conflict 
Data Program and International Peace Research Institute UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset. This variable captures the inability to peacefully resolve 
disputes among a state’s constituents. A civil war reflects a lack of social 
contract, a characteristic of weak states.16 Our latent variable equals 1 if there 
have been one or more incidents of civil war in that country between 1975 and 
2010, and 0 otherwise. 
On a comparative note regarding the outcome variables, a distinct feature of 
inflation is that, while other state capacity outcomes are all affected by both the 
‘lack of cooperation’ and ‘physical obstacle’ consequences of rugged terrain 
(e.g. the use of the terrain by civil insurgencies), the inability to commit is 
abstracted from the latter dimension and reflects only the lack of cooperation 
and collaboration among the constituent groups of the state. 
The main control variable included in Z is the ethnic fractionalisation index 
(EF) developed by Alesina et al. (2003). The role of ethnic fractionalisation in 
state capacity is well-established (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 1999; Besley & 
                                                 
15 Our measure does not include contributions to social security as part of the tax revenue, so it 
more accurately reflects the real strength capacity of states to collect taxes. 
16 On wealth inequalities between politically relevant ethnic groups and ethnic conflict, see 
Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011). 
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Persson 2009). Consequently, we include this index in all models.17 Other 
control variables are described in the results discussion below. The main 
sample consists of 190 independent countries around the world. Definitions 
and sources of the data are provided in Appendix A2. 
2.4. Empirical Results 
This section discusses the relationship between the latent indicators and the 
main independent variables; summary statistics are presented in Table 1. 
Figures 1a to 1d display the nonparametric relationships between the latent and 
independent variables. Some observations appear to be influential. Since logit 
regression uses numerical methods to approximate the solution, influential 
observations could seriously distort the behaviour of the maximum likelihood 
estimator (Bondell 2005). Accordingly, influential observations are trimmed.18 
Visual inspection of Figures 1a to 1d shows a potentially non-linear 
relationship between the latent variables and the terrain ruggedness index 
(TRI). We investigate whether these visual checks hold in the next subsections. 
2.4.1. Inflation 
Estimation results of Equation 3, using inflation as the latent variable, are 
presented in Table 2. The linear effect of TRI is investigated first. Column 1 
suggests that this choice performs poorly for the entire sample. In Column 2, a 
non-linear specification improves the fit, and the effect of TRI is estimated to 
be statistically significant. Coupled with the information in Figure 1a, this non-
linear effect implies that countries attempt to take advantage of ruggedness up 
to a point, but after that point, the geographical characteristic becomes 
                                                 
17 As an alternative fractionalisation phenomenon, we have considered linguistic fragmentation 
because language differences may pose a challenge to cooperation in collective action, but this 
variable has been estimated to be largely insignificant. This finding is consistent with the 
literature on ethnic fractionalisation above, suggesting that ethnicity matters more as a barrier 
to cooperation and that language differences can be overcome, at least for basic 
communication. 
18 Outliers are identified using influential analysis for binary models. Specifically, we make use 
of the Pregibon delta beta influence statistic to determine influential observations. This statistic 
is the counterpart for binary models of the traditional Cook’s distance used in least square 
models. 
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inhibiting. The mean of the individual marginal effects in Column 2 is positive, 
indicating, on average, a detrimental effect on state capacity. Column 3 
presents the results without Tajikistan, an outlier observation, where all 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant as before. Effectively, one 
standard deviation increase in TRI increases the likelihood of a high-inflation 
regime by 13 per cent. To investigate whether these results are driven by a 
specific region, countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America are 
eliminated one at a time. Columns 4 to 7 report that the results hold for all 
regions but Asia.19 This is not surprising given that many countries located in 
this part of the world are weak and rugged. In Column 10, our core factor is 
tested for its ability to predict state capacity within developing countries and 
former colonies, or when excluding small countries. Our predictor remains 
highly robust after these exercises. 
Another concern is the potential concentration of weak states in some regions, 
such as Africa, resulting in standard errors being artificially lowered. 
Statistically speaking, this problem could result in spatial correlation of the 
residuals. Clustering standard errors by regions, Column 11 shows that the 
estimates remain significant (this issue is revisited in Section 2.5.1). Columns 
12 to 14 add additional controls such as colonial origins,20 legal origins and 
latitude21 to control for particular institutions arising historically that affect a 
state’s strength. Our main variable remains robust. 
Overall, the findings highlight clearly that TRI is a significant predictor of 
inflation performance, suggesting that rugged topography deters coordination, 
resulting in an inability to commit and thus giving rise to a weak state. 
                                                 
19 For a within-Africa or -Asia regression, a higher sample size is needed given the estimation 
methodology. 
20 The year of independence is also included to control for different waves of decolonisation. 
Acemoglu et al. (2008) use this variable to distinguish extractive from settlement colonies and 
Olsson (2009) uses it to differentiate the two main waves of colonisation.  
21 Although latitude is different from climate variables (e.g. rainfall, extreme weather, number 
of seasons), several well-known studies have made used of latitude or distance to the equator 
as a proxy to summarise the average climate experienced in a country (see mainly Frankel & 
Romer 1999).  
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2.4.2. Rule of Law 
Table 3 presents a diverse set of results using rule of law as the outcome 
variable. Column 1 shows a regression with a linear predictor; estimates are not 
significant. The next specification, Column 2, adds a quadratic term for TRI. 
The main predictor is statistically significant, and the sign anticipated. 
Influential analysis was performed to verify whether some observations were 
driving the results. A visual inspection of Figure 2b suggests that Andorra, 
Lesotho, and Monaco might potentially affect the estimation. Column 3 finds 
that removing these observations improves the results. The estimates in Table 3 
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in TRI increases the likelihood 
of a low-rule of law regime by 11 per cent. Since rule of law is also a public 
good that needs to be constantly funded, its provision is highly affected by 
ongoing transaction costs. Thus, the results show that more rugged countries 
are less prone to sustaining law and order, all else constant.  
As in Section 2.4.1, countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America are 
eliminated one at a time to check whether the results are driven by specific 
geographic characteristics. The estimates, reported in Columns 4 to 7, are 
highly significant. Columns 8 to 10 utilise only developing countries, only 
former colonies, and exclude small countries, respectively, and the results 
remain robust. Column 11 presents the estimates with clustered standard errors 
by regions. Columns 12 to 15 add additional controls to the baseline regression 
and all results indicate the strong and robust predictive power of rugged 
physio-geography for state capacity as proxied by the rule of law. 
Olsson and Hansson (2011) argue that the maintenance of the rule of law 
depends on the size of the country  since it is more difficult to broadcast power 
from the capital to other regions. Therefore, the size of the country was added 
as an additional control in the baseline regression. Results show that TRI 
remains statistically significant.22 
                                                 
22 No interaction effects between country size and TRI were found, meaning that the effect of 
ruggedness is invariant to country size. Results are not presented here but are available upon 
request. 
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2.4.3. Tax Revenue/GDP 
Table 4 displays the results using tax revenue/GDP as the outcome variable 
proxying the capability of the state to collect taxes. Column 1 reports a 
regression with linear predictors; estimates are significant, although TRI is 
significant only at 10 per cent. The next specification adds a quadratic term for 
TRI to check whether there is a non-linear relationship. As the results are not 
statistically significant, the linear specification is preferred. Beginning with 
Column 3, initial government expenses23 are controlled for, since the scope of 
tax collection ultimately depends on government size. Controlling for this 
variable, the results are statistically significant. The test of influential 
observations reveals no country that may be of concern. Results eliminating 
Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America one at a time are displayed in Columns 
4 to 7, all of which are statistically significant, except, as above, when Asia is 
removed. Columns 8 to 10 utilise only developing countries, only former 
colonies, and exclude small countries, respectively. The results remain robust, 
except for only former colonies.24 Column 11 presents the estimates when 
using clustered standard errors by regions. Columns 12 to 15 add additional 
controls to the baseline regression. All results remain robust after these 
exercises. Marginal effects are highly consistent across the columns, 
suggesting that a one standard deviation rise in TRI increases the likelihood of 
poor-tax collection regime (i.e. being a weak state, by 6%). In posterior 
robustness checks, the cut-off point that defines a state as weak was increased 
to 17 per cent; however, TRI is not significant.25 The differing strength of TRI 
in this circumstance may indicate that tax collection performance in a country 
is driven by other factors in addition to TRI. 
                                                 
23 Initial government size corresponds to the average of government expenditure/GDP between 
1985 and 1989. Incorporating further years into the regression can lead to reverse causality. 
24 Again, the loss in significance could be caused by a reduction in sample size. 
25 Results are available upon request. 
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2.4.4. Presence of Civil War 
Results using the presence of civil war as the latent indicator of state fragility 
are displayed in Table 5. Column 1 shows marginal effects using a linear 
model in predictors. A quadratic term for TRI is added in Column 2, providing 
even more significant estimates. Figure 2b suggests that Tajikistan might be an 
influential observation. Removing this observation in Column 3 does not 
drastically change the estimates. Results eliminating Africa, Asia, Europe and 
Latin America one at a time are displayed in Columns 4 to 7, respectively, all 
of which are statistically significant. Columns 8 to 10 show that relationships 
are significant within developing countries, former colonies and when 
excluding small countries. Column 11 presents the estimates when using 
clustered standard errors by regions. Columns 12 to 15 add additional controls 
to the baseline regression. All results remain robustly significant after these 
exercises. Marginal effects are highly consistent across the columns, 
suggesting that a one standard deviation rise in TRI increases the likelihood of 
a high civil conflict regime by 20 per cent. 
2.4.5. Early Urbanisation as a Transmission Mechanism 
So far we have focused on the direct predictive power of TRI on state capacity 
in a reduced form framework. However, we cannot say anything about the 
mechanisms through which this relationship establishes itself. It is likely that 
physio-geography affects the very devices or platforms that facilitate the 
building of state capacity and the maintenance of its operations. While there 
might be several such channels, we focus on early urbanisation (i.e. in 1900). 
The central reasoning here is that rugged terrain may delay the urbanisation 
process, with the latter forming the ‘bridge’ for TRI to affect state capacity. 
The effect of the initial pattern of urbanisation on state formation in Europe has 
been subject to numerous scholarly works (Stasavage 2010). The novelty in 
our approach is to generalise this argument to a large group of countries and 
test it empirically as an explicit mechanism between TRI and several state 
capacity measures. There are two possible dimensions of early urbanisation 
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that may facilitate stronger states today. First, building up cities (i.e. 
urbanisation) per se requires that citizens choose to stay in a specific urban 
area and not to exit. Urbanised societies are more likely to have solved their tax 
collection problem, and have better infrastructure and connectivity. This is 
because minimal organisational costs, for which the cost of the first unit of 
collective good will be exceedingly high in relation to the cost of the 
subsequent units, are more likely to be borne in an urban setting (Olson 1971). 
It is also well documented that urban centres typically do not exhibit self-
sufficient production patterns and, therefore, need to exchange and cooperate 
with other polities in order to endure. Economic gains from trade, 
specialisation and agglomeration determine this ability for urban centres. In 
addition, in various parts of the world, urban settlements were granted some 
degree of autonomy to self-manage their laws, rules and even taxes. Thus, 
cities (i.e. those with a ‘sizeable’ population) are considered a cooperation 
success (Glaeser 2011). Urbanisation is also likely to yield stronger political 
organisation through labour unions, churches, universities and professional 
associations. In general, organisational capital, which is needed to build and 
sustain a state, is likely to emerge in an urbanised society. 
The second effect is related to the ‘earliness’ of this phenomenon. That is, for 
early urbanised societies, the timeframe considered becomes larger such that 
there is a longer period over which organisational capital can emerge, and in 
stronger terms. Therefore, our hypothesis from this discussion is that all else 
being equal, rugged terrain delays the urbanisation process and such societies 
are less likely to have strong states today. 
In light of this, we first test whether TRI can explain early urbanisation, and 
whether early urbanisation can, in turn, predict the measures capturing state 
capacity.26 Results are displayed in Table 6. Columns 1 and 2, using least 
squares estimation, document strongly that TRI is negatively related to 
                                                 
26 Data for urbanisation in 107 countries in 1900 were obtained from Chandler (1987). The 
data are for settlements with populations above 40,000. If a country has no such settlement, 
then the urbanisation rate of that country was assumed to be 0. This assumption is addressed in 
the regressions by controlling for those observations with a dummy. Data for countries’ total 
population to calculate the urbanisation rate were obtained from McEvedy and Jones (1978). 
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urbanisation in 1900, even after several controls. That is, the more rugged the 
country, the less urbanised it was in 1900. This is a critical finding, since early 
urbanisation may also be related to initial institutions. Therefore, this result can 
shed some light on the importance of physio-geography for initial institutions 
that matter for current outcomes (Stasavage 2010). The next question is 
whether the extent of early urbanisation represents a country’s ability to act 
collectively today. Columns 3 to 5 show that such a channel effect does not 
exist when inflation is regarded as the state capacity outcome. Given the 
insignificance of TRI and early urbanisation, it is possible to suggest that TRI 
has a unique direct effect on state capacity. 
However, Columns 6 to 8, presenting the predicted probabilities for the rule of 
law, show that early urbanisation and TRI remain good predictors of the latent 
variable, as before. This means that TRI has two effects in place: a direct effect 
on the rule of law and an indirect effect working through early urbanisation. 
Columns 9 to 11 document only a direct effect of TRI on outcomes of state 
capacity. Last, controlling for several variables, early urbanisation has the 
predicted negative effect on the presence of civil war, with a z-statistic of -
1.85. When TRI is included in the model, this effect is almost completely 
washed out, meaning that there is at least some effect working through our 
suggested channel. 
2.5. Robustness Checks 
2.5.1. Statistical Independence and Spatial Spillovers in State 
Capacity 
If bordering countries share similar terrain characteristics, then each country 
may not necessarily constitute a statistically independent observation. For 
instance, the whole of Africa may very well be regarded as a few independent 
data points based on physio-geography (e.g. many countries share the Sahara 
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desert). This suggests that spatial spillovers may exist in state capacity between 
neighbouring countries based on geographical characteristics.27  
To test for a global spatial autocorrelation of state capacity, Moran’s I test for 
TRI was performed using a contiguity matrix—entries are 1 for countries 
sharing a common land border, and 0 otherwise.28 The Moran’s I statistic for 
the sample is equal to 0.274, with a z-score of 5.019 and a p-value of 0.01, 
suggesting global spatial autocorrelation. We address this problem by 
incorporating the spatial dimension of TRI in the estimation.29 Thus, Equation 
1 becomes: 
௜ܻ
כ ൌ ݂൫ܴܶܫ௜ǡ ܧܨ௜ǡܹܳ௝ǡ ܼ௜൯ሺͷሻ 
where W is a spatial weight matrix. To obtain W, we use a contiguity matrix 
weighted by neighbour’s surface area. ܳ௝ are neighbours’ terrain. A significant 
estimate for φ would indicate possible spatial spillovers across bordering 
countries. The average marginal effects of Equation 5 using neighbours’ 
ruggedness are shown in Table 7. In general, no evidence is found for 
neighbours’ ruggedness affecting country outcomes directly. Even with the 
inclusion of neighbours’ ruggedness, the main predictors maintain their 
explanatory power. Thus, our confidence in the statistically significant 
estimates in Tables 1 to 4 is increased. 
2.5.2. Other Possible Mechanisms 
The main idea behind this essay is to use the collective action theory to explain 
the formation of a state. However, a state may be formed in other ways too. For 
instance, a society may start out with an elite dominance of the political scene 
and citizens may simply be inactive players (Acemoglu & Robinson 2008). To 
isolate the collective action channel as much as possible, we include in the 
regressions land gini at independence. Despite being an imperfect measure of 
                                                 
27 See also Ades and Chua (1997) and Murdoch and Sandler (2004) for negative consequences 
of social unrest and civil wars that spread spatially across countries. 
28 Data are obtained from Mayer and Zignago (2005). 
29 This subsection does not try to answer if there are spillover effects of state capacity among 
countries but whether or not there are spill-over effects of terrain ruggedness. 
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the power of elites,30 this variable’s inclusion in Equation 1 does not greatly 
alter the standard errors of TRI (Panel A in Table 8).  
Another possible mechanism is related to artificial states. Although we have 
controlled for colonial legacy as the main factor behind this phenomenon, 
artificial political boundaries that do not coincide with ‘natural’ ethnic 
divisions on the field may blur our collective action story; see Alesina, Easterly 
and Matuszeski (2011) for a systematic, innovative treatment of these states. 
We incorporate their fractal measure of artificial states into our main equation, 
but this does not change the thrust of our results (Panel B in Table 8).31 
Regime type might also blur the ‘mapping’ from collective action to state 
capacity. For instance, lack of collective action might lead to an autocrat taking 
over the reign of the country, who might, in turn, establish a strong state. We 
test whether TRI explains constraints on the executive at independence, with 
the latter being a measure of the regime type, but find no significant link to 
initiate the concerned mechanism (Panel C in Table 8).32 
2.6. Conclusions 
Traditionally, the state has been conceived as an organisation that is able to 
implement any type of policy. However, constraints related to its own capacity 
have generally been disregarded. Accordingly, a recent research agenda has 
begun investigating the main determinants of state capacity (Acemoglu 2005; 
Besley & Persson 2009; 2010; 2011a; 2011b). Considering that the success of 
                                                 
30 Admittedly, the empirics of such a channel can be more complex given interaction effects 
that may exist. For instance, initial political inequality could shape the initial set of institutions, 
coalitions, bureaucracy and military. A more elaborate analysis needs to consider the 
interactions between political regime, elite strength, mass formation, and the like. 
31 The fractal measure is estimated to be insignificant in three cases, thus, it is justifiable to 
remove it from those equations. The reduction in the standard error of TRI when the fractal 
measure is included in the rule of law equation is contributed by the reduced sample size.  
32 The validity of our core argument from an historical point of view primarily relies on the 
evidence provided by Stasavage (2010) for Europe during 1250–1750. Still, it would be 
desirable to investigate TRI’s explanatory power on historical state capacity. Historical series 
on state capacity measures are, unfortunately, not available for many countries. Although it 
would not replace this shortcoming, repeating the analysis above for only contemporary 
developed countries, yields, as anticipated, much less significant evidence, reflecting a weaker 
link between state capacity and ‘initial conditions’ in that set of countries. 
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the state depends on cooperation, ability to commit, and provision of public 
goods, this essay indicates an exogenous feature that can affect cooperation in 
collective action: physio-geography. This study’s analysis provides robust and 
clear evidence that terrain ruggedness, representing physio-geography, plays 
critical role in a state’s capacity. Exploiting sizeable variations in the 
topography of countries around the world, we document, using a latent variable 
model, that this factor strongly predicts state capacity outcomes today, such as 
inflation, rule of law, tax collection, and presence of civil war. This evidence is 
robust across other estimation approaches and consistent with the collective 
action theory, whereby transaction costs generated by terrain ruggedness 
constitute major setbacks to act collectively. 
The essay next demonstrated that early urbanisation, an intermediate outcome 
of collective action, forms a significant mechanism for the observed 
relationship between terrain ruggedness and state capacity. More specifically, 
countries that urbanised in the relatively distant past to develop the necessary 
infrastructures and organisations to live together in large settlements can 
maintain a stronger state apparatus that can provide improved public goods 
provision. While there may be other possible mechanisms involved, such as 
social trust and land distribution, their effects are likely to be more nuanced in 
that they may interact with other variables, such as the power of the elites, 
history, and other initial conditions. These mechanisms, together with other 
underlying factors, can be a fruitful research avenue for the empirics of state 
capacity. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Latent Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Inflation Rule of law Tax revenue/GDP Years in civil war 
Mean  44.19 -0.07 16.47 0.26 
Standard 
deviation  
107.61 0.97 7.5 0.79 
Percentiles %     
0 3.72 -1.27 8.14 0 
25 5.22 -0.85 11.4 0 
50 8.49 -0.24 15.23 0 
75 18.57 0.61 21.03 0 
90 124.11 1.38 25.35 1.01 
Obs. 186 191 148 160 
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Appendix 
A1. The Relationship between Terrain Ruggedness and Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
In our study, we have controlled our latent models using ethnic 
fractionalisation as a main control, following the literature. However, 
Michalopoulos (2012) establishes that variations in soil quality and elevation 
can explain ethnic diversity today, except for its component that was 
determined after 1500 AD. We investigate the implications of this intuitive 
finding on our results in a few ways. First, we test whether EF is explained by 
TRI in our sample. Table A1 shows that the answer is in the affirmative when 
TRI enters the equation non-linearly with our usual controls. Accordingly, we 
remove TRI appropriately from our main equations, and find that the average 
marginal effects (AMEs) of EF are reduced by an average of six per cent 
across all four dependent variables (compared to AMEs reported in Column 15 
of Tables 2–5). This drop, however, does not seem to be huge. Second, 
checking the simple correlation between TRI and EF, we find it to be -0.14 and 
statistically insignificant. Third, in unreported regressions, we interact TRI and 
EF in our main equations and find these terms to be statistically insignificant. 
Thus, it appears that the component of ethnic fragmentation that was shaped 
post-1500 AD is an important predictor for today’s state capacity and therefore 
it cannot be ignored from the main analysis. Given these results, it seems more 
appropriated to use EF rather than soil quality as a more immediate platform 
for collective action without disregarding considerable information. 
A2. Estimation Method 
One concern with a latent variable model is that relevant information may be 
left out when constructing the latent indicators. Also, the choice of threshold 
for the outcome indicator may be arbitrary, especially in the case of rare 
events. To see whether a continuous treatment of the state capacity would 
make a difference, a least squares estimation was adopted. Results, shown in 
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Table A2 below, indicate that TRI is statistically significant in explaining rule 
of law and persistence of civil war, but not for inflation and taxation. It is 
conceivable that an extra unit of terrain ruggedness may not be able to explain 
an extra unit of inflation or an extra percentage of tax proceeds; rather, it could 
explain the probability of high inflation or better tax collection performance, as 
moderated by the collective action channel. We also use the State Fragility 
Index (SFI) 2009 of Marshall and Cole (2011) as the dependent variable, 
despite the reservations about such indices (Besley & Persson 2011). Results 
indicate that TRI strongly predicts this continuous variable in the anticipated 
direction. 
A3. Other Possible Concerns 
Trust and Social Capital 
The reduced form model may also not capture all processes leading a society to 
cooperate. For instance, trust and social capital have largely been seen as key 
ingredients for cooperation in role model states. Accordingly, correlations 
between trust-related cross-country measures and TRI (unreported) have been 
checked for, but no significant relationships were observed, nor any change in 
TRI coefficients when the former were included in Equation 1. Instead of 
ruling out this mechanism completely, it is our conjecture that trust may affect 
a state’s foundations through their associations with other interactive factors, 
such as history, wars and climate. For instance, in a recent study, Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2011) show that the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade to 
which Africa was subjected more than 400 years ago strongly explains the 
mistrust within African society today. One would probably need to model 
some interactions to capture such linkages. 
Population Density 
If there are no people living around mountains, why should we care about 
terrain ruggedness? Using population-weighted ruggedness, which factors in 
the population share of each 30-by-30 arch-second cell into the calculation of 
the ruggedness index (as provided by Nunn & Puga 2012), finds statistically 
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significant effects on rule of law and civil conflict, a nearly significant effect 
on inflation, and an effect with z-statistic equal to 1 on taxation performance, 
with all coefficient signs prevailing as before. Although the population data 
belong to 2000 in the calculation and population movements over time are 
unaccounted for, these results seem to support our main argument (results 
available upon request). 
Informal Economy 
An important limitation in testing our main hypothesis is the lack of a direct 
measure for ability to tax. Thus, as an additional proxy, we use the share of 
shadow economy in GDP (Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro 2010), a reverse 
measure of the ‘ability to tax’ and provision of public good availability, in our 
analysis. Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit results strongly support 
the positive (and non-linear) role of terrain ruggedness in the likelihood of 
observing a larger informal economy in the countries (results available upon 
request). 
Country Size (Log Area) 
As noted in the text, Stasavage (2010) find that more compact states are more 
governable. Thus, a valid concern in our case is whether the TRI somehow 
penalises large states or has a correlation with state size. When controlling for 
log surface area throughout the models, the estimates for TRI remains robust 
and significant in all of the regressions. 
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A4. Data Sources and Descriptions 
Variable Source Description Link 
Inflation World Bank (2013), 
World Development 
Indicators database.  
GDP deflator (annual %) http://databank.worldbank.org 
Rule of law Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
 http://info.worldbank.org/governan
ce/wgi/index.asp 
Tax revenue/ GDP World Bank (2013), 
World Development 
Indicators database. 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) http://databank.worldbank.org 
Civil conflict Uppsala University 
Conflict Program and 
International Peace 
Research Institute 
(2013), UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset  
Presence of civil war http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp
/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflic
t_dataset/ 
Terrain ruggedness 
index 
Nunn and Puga (2012)  http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Alesina et al. (2003)  http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/facul
ty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloa
ds/fractionalization.xls 
Government size World Bank (2013), 
World Development 
Indicators database. 
Expense (% of GDP) http://databank.worldbank.org 
Colonial origins and 
independence years 
Acemoglu et al. (2008) 
and Olsson (2009) 
 http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/ac
emoglu/data/ajry2008 
Legal origins La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer 
(2008) 
 http://www.economics.harvard.edu
/faculty/shleifer/files/JEL_%20web
.xls 
Latitude, area Nunn and Puga (2012)  http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
Security legitimacy 
index 
Marshall and Cole 
(2011) 
Secleg http://www.systemicpeace.org/insc
r/SFIv2010a.xls 
Contiguity matrix  Mayer and Zignago 
(2005) 
 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/b
dd/distances.htm 
  
 
 State Capacity: How to Mitigate the Chapter 3:
Adverse Consequences of Terrain Ruggedness? 
3.1. Introduction 
The importance of rugged terrain for economic development and performance 
is vividly debated among political scientists, economists, policymakers and 
practitioners alike. While some studies show that rugged terrain increases 
communication costs, hinders agricultural production and provides natural 
advantages for warfare (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Gibson & Rozelle 2003), other 
studies document that rugged topography may provide some benefits for 
contemporaneous development outcomes through their impact on institutions 
(Nunn & Puga 2012).  
In order to better understand the net effect of terrain ruggedness, academic 
research currently focuses on elucidating the channels through which different 
geographic characteristics may have an effect on long-run economic 
development. A recent influential paper by Nunn and Puga (2012) suggests 
that more rugged countries in Africa were less exposed to slave trafficking 
since this geographic characteristic provided natural barriers to natives looking 
for safer places to hide in order to avoid being captured. As a result, citizens of 
those countries have more trust in their counterparts than in less rugged 
countries in Africa. This social capital has resulted in better institutional 
quality and development in general, relative to those converse cases. 
Conversely, Dell (2010) finds that places where early Spanish settlers in Peru 
had imposed a coercive labour system called mita have currently lower levels 
of consumption and public goods than places where they had not. Interestingly, 
this labour institution needed rugged places to work to prevent workers/slaves 
from escaping.1 The first essay in this thesis finds that terrain ruggedness is 
                                                 
1 Stasavage (2010) analyses the impact of other geographic dimensions on past institutions, 
observing that small European countries were more likely to have more representative 
institutions than larger countries in medieval times. This was because assemblies in small 
countries could meet more frequently due to significantly lower travel costs, which meant that 
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negatively correlated to state capacity on average, and proposes that bad 
topography delayed the modern urbanisation process, which in turn is 
negatively correlated to the current levels of state capacity.  
While there is a renewed interest in geographic determinants of economic 
outcomes, little attention has been paid to interactions between geographical 
characteristics and a state’s behaviour. Recent research, nevertheless, suggests 
that certain influential characteristics can emerge in such geographically 
challenged states that produce highly favourable development outcomes 
despite this initial handicap. In fact, there are some ‘unlucky’ countries, from a 
topography point of view, that have been able to develop a strong state 
apparatus. Vibrant examples of these countries are Austria, Switzerland and 
Norway.2 A question that naturally arises is: what did these countries do to 
mitigate the negative effect of terrain ruggedness such that they were able to 
develop strong state capacity? Although there is an array of possible answers to 
this question, the aim of this essay is to narrow down these possibilities.  
Thus, this essay analyses if there are human-made factors that alleviate the 
negative effects of rough topography on state capacity. One clear negative 
effect of unfavourable geography is increased transaction costs when citizens 
of the state are geographically dispersed. Thus, any device or mechanism 
reducing those transaction costs, particularly for law and order enforcement 
and state functions such as tax collection, service provision and domestic 
market development, must have a positive effect on state capacity. Agenor 
(2010) demonstrates that, initially, road infrastructure can be a key factor in 
reducing transaction costs and therefore regarded as a basic ground layer for 
development. Given its positive externalities to the private sector (i.e. reducing 
time to travel and transport goods, providing quicker access to education and 
health services and, even more importantly, freeing time for more productive 
tasks), road density is crucial to developing living standards in rugged 
geographical areas, and the key for citizens’ incorporation into the state’s 
                                                                                                                                 
they could monitor public finances more closely and the public were keener to pay taxes, 
augmenting the state capacity to obtain revenue. 
2 The fact that there are some rugged countries with a good status apparatus does not change 
the nature of the negative correlation between rugged terrain and state capacity. 
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system. Roads open up important channels of connection on a political and 
social level as well, decreasing the autonomous nature of population enclaves 
in a geographically dispersed population within a rugged terrain. Following 
this reasoning, and the reverse causation problem notwithstanding, this essay 
asks if building roads produces positive outcomes for the development of state 
capacity, particularly in countries with difficult terrains.  
Institutional design is another candidate for alleviating the adverse effects of 
rugged terrain on state capacity. Accordingly, the essay asks if fiscal and 
political design helps to overcome the negativity of rough topography. 
Specifically, can fiscal and political decentralisation reduce transactions costs? 
Initially, one could surmise that decentralisation could increase coordination 
costs, making its adoption less favourable. For instance, Gerring, Thacker and 
Moreno (2005) assert that good governance is achieved in countries with 
inclusive institutions that are able to centralise political power and implement 
pacts and agreements, rather than in those countries that decentralise power. 
However, this argument does not take into account other benefits of 
decentralisation such as those from better handling the diversity of preferences 
within a political circumscription or more efficiently managing large political 
entities, avoiding internal tension. As many arguments regarding the benefits 
and costs of decentralisation can be cast, the empirical analysis in this essay 
aims to clarify the situation with respect to rugged countries, and to answer 
whether fiscal and political decentralisation have a different impact on them.  
In sum, the key contribution of this essay is to fill the gap in the literature 
regarding the link between geography and state capacity by empirically 
investigating to what extent road infrastructure and political and fiscal 
decentralisation reduce the negative impact of rugged terrain on state capacity, 
using a sample of independent countries over the period 1960–2010.  
The essay is organised as follows: Section 3.2 briefly discusses the links 
between state capacity and the proposed mitigating factors. Section 3.3 
describes the data used in the analysis and outlines the empirical strategy. 
Section 3.4 presents the empirical results and Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2. Conceptual Overview 
It is generally agreed in the political science field that societies are organised 
around states, which are self-governing political entities with a centralised 
source of authority that can enforce rules and use legitimate means of coercion 
to control the territory inside its boundaries. However, there is an array of 
states where this definition holds only partially. In the international relations 
literature, they are called fragile or weak states, meaning that they have limited 
capabilities to fulfil their basic obligations.3 Although this might seem an issue 
of more interest to other fields rather than economics, recent research shows 
that having a weak state apparatus also has negative consequences on 
economic outcomes. Acemoglu (2005) and Besley and Persson (2009; 2011) 
demonstrate that weak states are unable to tax, redistribute welfare and provide 
public goods, including protection of property rights, which has long-term and 
persistent negative consequences for economic development. Hence state 
capacity is also of strong concern to the policy or development economist. 
Theoretical research on state capacity lists the sources of state fragility—the 
inability of the state to fulfil its obligations—as heterogeneity of preferences 
between the constituents and high transactions costs due to geographical 
constraints (Besley & Persson 2011; Olsson & Hansson 2011). For instance, 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that lengthy civil wars are more prone to onset in 
mountainous regions since this topographic feature provides rebels with natural 
advantages to fight against the central power (e.g. as in Colombia or 
Afghanistan). Also, Scott (2009) claims that mountains in South-East Asia 
have been used as sacred havens for people not wanting to become part of the 
modern state. In other words, Scott acknowledges that rugged terrain obstructs 
the expansion of the state machinery into the hinterland. Moreover, Herbst 
(2000) pioneers the idea that rugged terrain in Africa hinders the projection of 
power from the centre of territories to their periphery due to highly prohibitive 
costs of expansion. Therefore, states in such areas are destined to face 
                                                 
3 State capacity can be interpreted as the ability/capacity of a country to govern its territory in 
an efficient manner. Thus, countries lacking state capacity are seen as weak or fragile states.  
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difficulties with respect to unification and border control. Although this strand 
of research seems to provide a geographic deterministic explanation of why 
some countries might find it difficult to control their territory efficiently, the 
underlying implication from a state capacity reading of the literature is that 
rugged terrain is a key obstacle to the state’s ability to project power within its 
territorial boundaries. 
Historically, amplifying the road network has been viewed as a key method of 
broadcasting power to the hinterland.4 There are numerous historical examples 
of how emperors and rulers built roads to incorporate territories into their 
empires and states.5 The economics literature on the benefits of building road 
infrastructure is vast. It is widely known that roads induce total factor 
productivity gains by reducing transaction costs and thus facilitating trade, 
market integration, factor mobility 6  and the spread of ideas (World Bank 
2009).7 In addition, building roads increases capital stock with positive impacts 
on income per capita (Banerjee, Duflo & Qian 2012; Canning 1999; Esfahani 
& Ramirez 2003). Further, expanding the road network can serve as a bridge to 
approximate public services (e.g. health, education, law and order) to the 
hinterland (Agenor 2010); creating room to legitimise the action of state. 
Based on this reasoning, our argument is that an increase in the road network 
diminishes transaction costs between individuals, facilitating political and 
economic engagement. Importantly, expanding the radius of state activity to 
the hinterland delivers more public services, ‘buying’ the ability to extract 
resources and bolster territories in the hinterland. Thus, road infrastructure has 
a positive effect on state capacity where rugged terrain would otherwise thwart 
the projection of state power. 
                                                 
4 Scott (2009) predicts that stateless people in South-East Asia people would disappear as 
states build and expand their transportation network to reach ‘hilly’ areas. 
5 Setting aside the conceptual differences between empires and modern states, one example of 
road construction and broadcasting of power is the Roman Empire. Sais (2006) finds that 
military governments often choose to maintain a good road system to expedite the movement 
of troops. 
6 Factor mobility is seen as a key determinant in achieving income convergence in areas where 
the population is culturally and linguistically homogeneous.  
7 Yet the presence of more roads could lead to congestion and other environmental problems. 
For an updated synthesis of the literature, refer to World Bank (2009). 
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Another approach to mitigate the obstruction of state capacity when the state 
governing body is separated from its citizens is to physically extend an arm of 
the state into the areas of concern. A country that has challenges projecting 
power because of its size might decide to transfer some power to local 
governments to keep those territories unified under it and avoid secession 
(Alesina 2003). In reality, sharing power implies transfer of legal decision 
making, roles and responsibilities to lower tiers of government. The literature 
defines political decentralisation as the process of granting subnational bodies 
the right to legislate in some areas without the right of veto from the central 
authority (Treisman 2002). Conversely, fiscal decentralisation is more related 
to the delegation of administrative tasks and spending under the broad agenda 
of the centralised government. The extent of fiscal decentralisation is usually 
reflected in the percentage of revenues or expenses out of the corresponding 
total, which is the responsibility of subnational governments.8 
We observe two strands of literature regarding geographically induced 
detachment of government from its constituents, which are essentially two 
sides of the same coin. In particular, the analysis of combatting state capacity 
constraints in a geographically challenged environment is well placed within 
the classic public finance theoretical framework. Classical public finance 
theory predicts that fiscal decentralisation reduces asymmetries between 
citizens and the central authority, making the provision of public goods more 
tailored to each region (Oates 1972),9 Theoretically, fiscal decentralisation is 
optimal when the marginal cost of providing ‘governance’ for a centralised 
polity is higher than the benefits. Generally, in the literature, these costs are 
directly related to the size of the territory, ethnic composition of the population 
and income inequality (heterogeneous demand). For instance, the size of a 
territory increases the costs of centralised provision of public goods because 
the distance of the central government to the location where the goods are 
provided will render it detached and disconnected from the needs of the people 
                                                 
8 Dreher and Fisher (2010, p. 986) call political autonomy the ‘right to decide’ and fiscal 
decentralisation ‘the right to act’. 
9 Classical notes on fiscal federalism are Tiebout (1956) and Musgrave (1959). Oates (1999) 
provides a synthesis of these arguments.  
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there. That is, where the centralised authority cannot perceive, share and 
monitor people’s needs because it is too far removed from them, they are 
unlikely to be able to gauge the extent and nature of their needs correctly. This 
suggests that a decentralised representative of the government providing the 
services according to the needs of the population may be able to counter the 
obvious costs that centralised provision would entail. 
However, territorial size, ethnic composition and other population 
heterogeneities are not the only factors that can detach a centralised 
government from its populace. As previously discussed, were the distance to be 
short but the topography between the central government and the governed 
extremely rugged, the exact same costs should also apply to the central 
government’s provision of public goods under these circumstances. In essence, 
any barrier to communication and cooperation will increase the costs of 
centralised government provision of public goods. 
So, the question that this essay asks is: When might we expect political 
decentralisation to be effective? The decision to fiscally decentralise a country 
should logically depend on the perceived net benefits of this path. 
Theoretically, the benefits of maintaining a central fiscal government are 
economies of scale in the provision of public goods and management of the tax 
base and better coordination in the implementation of broad public policies, 
especially those regarding monetary and fiscal policy. Empirical evidence 
regarding the net costs or benefits of fiscal decentralisation yield mixed results. 
While Akai and Sakata (2002), Fisman and Gatti (2003), Iimi (2005) and Falch 
and Fischer (2012) find positive outcomes related to decentralisation; other 
studies show that decentralisation brings net costs (see Prud’Homme 1995; 
Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra 2011; Zhang & Zou 1998).10 
Although earlier results are mixed, previous analyses do not differentiate 
between the benefits of decentralisation for rugged as opposed to non-rugged 
countries. Our conjecture is that fiscal decentralisation could yield particular 
                                                 
10 Weingast (2014) has an extensive discussion on the current stance of fiscal decentralisation 
on economic development. 
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benefits to topographically challenged states. Decentralisation reduces the 
negative impact of rugged terrain by fiscally breaking down territories into 
smaller ones, forcing policymakers to consider the cost structure of each 
particular region when providing public goods. Thus, we expect that 
decentralisation could enhance state capacity where the terrain is more rugged 
than in states where topographical changes are smoother, holding other 
variables constant. 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
To test our predicted relationships, we first need to measure state capacity. 
Different measures have been developed lately, mainly in the international aid 
context, to assess the level of state capacity. However, Besley and Persson 
(2011) assert that measuring state capacity is problematic given the nature and 
multidimensionality of the concept and because most of the current indicators 
measuring it cannot differentiate causes from consequences.11 Thus, statistical 
inference using such indicators directly could not be robust. Yet the main 
problem with the term state capacity is the lack of a widely accepted definition, 
so finding indicators of it could be cumbersome. What is agreed in the 
literature, however, is that the state is responsible for providing some basic 
functions, such as enforcing stability and maintaining peace and order. In order 
to perform these functions, the state needs to have different capabilities, and 
arguably, those cannot be directly observed. In an attempt to overcome this 
caveat, the first essay in this thesis operationalizes the term state capacity 
through a latent variable approach that models the outcomes of state capacity 
via suitable indicators. Specifically, if a continuous variable ݔ, representing 
one outcome, is equal or higher than a certain threshold level, then the 
transformed indicator ݔ  equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Briefly, this transformed 
variable indicates whether or not a state has a weak status apparatus, and it can 
be estimated using a suitable estimator for binary response.12 The main idea of 
                                                 
11 Examples of such measures are the Index of State Weakness compiled by the Brookings 
Institution and the State Fragility Index calculated by the Polity IV project. 
12 State capacity is an unobservable ‘skill/capability’ for researchers in the same way that 
students’ skills are unobservable for teachers. Teachers assess students’ skills by looking at 
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this approach is to reveal whether or not a country is weak by looking at the 
consequences of state capacity rather than trying to find a measure of a concept 
that itself is difficult to assess. Outcomes of state capacity considered in this 
essay are inflation, lack of rule of law, low levels of taxation, and presence of 
civil war.13 All sources and definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
Data for terrain ruggedness are taken from Nunn and Puga’s (2012) index, 
which quantifies the degree of topographic irregularity in a given surface based 
on elevation models relying on satellite images.14 The terrain ruggedness indes 
(TRI) takes higher values as the level of irregularity increases. The novelty of 
this measure is that it is able to capture fine changes in the terrain, which gives 
a better idea of how rugged a country is. Very rugged countries in Nunn and 
Puga’s sample are, for instance, Nepal, Bhutan, Switzerland and Tajikistan.  
The road density indicator (RD) for each country is constructed by weighting 
road network by country surface. Data measuring a country’s land size and the 
length of its road network are taken from the World Development Indicators 
dataset averaged over the period 1991–2010 (World Bank 2013). The road 
network indicator measures all roads built in a country in kilometres, 
regardless of their quality. Among our sample, the countries with the highest 
road density are Malta, Bahrain and Belgium. 
Fiscal decentralisation (FD) is proxied by the subnational revenue share; 
specifically, the revenue collected by local and municipal tiers divided by the 
national total revenue. Data are obtained from the Fiscal Decentralization 
Indicators, a dataset containing standardised information across countries until 
2000. This dataset is gathered by the World Bank (World Bank 2013), and 
obtained through the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance 
Statistics (International Monetary Fund 2013). We average this indicator for 
the period 1990–2000. The most fiscally decentralised countries in our dataset 
                                                                                                                                 
outcomes (e.g. exam marks), as it is impossible to observe natural abilities of performing 
certain cognitive tasks. Only students who achieve a score equal or higher than the pass mark 
are thought to have the minimum ability required and pass the exam/grade. Our approach for 
rating state capacity follows a similar logic.  
13 For a better understanding of the methodology regarding latent variables, see Chapter 2.  
14 For technical details about the index, see Riley, DeGloria and Elliot (1999). 
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are Serbia and Montenegro, Canada and China, while the most fiscally 
centralised countries are Cyprus, Swaziland and Ethiopia. 
Political autonomy (PA) comes from a dataset compiled by Treisman (2008). 
Specifically, we use a dichotomous indicator that equals 1 if local governments 
are allowed by the constitutions to legislate in their respective areas such that 
the federal government cannot have any say on such laws. In other words, this 
variable indicates if there are autonomous local political legislative bodies 
below the national legislative branch whereby the latter could not overrule any 
decision made by the former. There are 18 countries in our dataset with a 
constitutional decentralised decision-making process following Treisman’s 
definition. Some examples, among others, are Austria, India and Switzerland. 
3.3.1. Important Covariates 
Besley and Person (2009; 2011) assert that state capacity is negatively related 
to heterogeneity of ethnic preferences and we account for this observation by 
controlling for the degree of ethnic fractionalisation in all of our models. Data 
for this indicator are taken from Alesina et al. (2003). Additionally, initial 
income per capita is incorporated into the estimating equation to mitigate the 
possible endogeneity issue arising from the fact that richer countries could 
afford better road infrastructures or better institutional frameworks. Other 
initial conditions affecting outcomes of state capacity such as legal origins, 
colonial origins, year of independence and geographical position have been 
widely documented in the macro development literature and have therefore 
been included as control variables in our empirical specification. 
3.3.2. Methodology 
Our baseline regression model is: 
௜ܻ
כ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܶܫ௜ ൅ ߚଶܯ௜ ൅ߚଷሺܴܶܫ௜ כ ܯ௜ሻ ൅ ࢆߚ 
where ௜ܻכ is one the outcomes of state capacity; (i) the average inflation rate 
over the period 1960 to 2009, (ii) the rule of law averaged over the period 1996 
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to 2010, (iii) tax revenue/GDP averaged over the period 1990 to 2009, and (iv) 
the presence of civil war over the period 1975 to 2010.  
Each of these indicators is binary by construction so a logit model is used to 
estimate the main relationships. TRI represents terrain ruggedness index, the 
main independent variable, M is one of our mitigating factors, and the 
interaction term between TRI and M accounts for a differential effect of the 
mitigating factor in more rugged countries. Z denotes the vector of controls. 
3.4. Empirical Results 
In this section we describe our main findings in relation to each of the three 
hypothesised mitigating factors. Table 1a shows summary statistics for our 
variables of interest and dependent variables.15 
3.4.1. Road Density 
Panel A in Table 2 shows the results using inflation as the latent variable for 
state capacity and road density as the mitigating factor.16 Column 1 indicates 
that TRI exerts a negative non-linear effect on state capacity; confirming prior 
results. RD is statistically significant with a negative sign, indicating that in 
fact it is associated with less inflation in the long run on average for all the 
countries in the sample. This is in line with one of our main hypotheses, that 
more roads might facilitate cooperation between citizens and therefore increase 
state capacity. We include the initial level of income as a control to account for 
the fact that richer countries might have started with higher road density. With 
the aim of identifying the basic relationship between RD, state capacity and 
TRI, Column 2 introduces the interaction term of RD and TRI in a model with 
linear TRI to avoid masking some effects that the interaction term might cause 
on the non-linear term of TRI given our logit estimation methodology. We find 
                                                 
15 Table 1b shows the correlation matrix between the independent variables used as mitigating 
factors. 
16 We present logit estimates because we are interested in observing interaction effects of TRI 
and other variables. Presenting AMEs would hide the statistical significance of the interaction 
term. AMEs are available upon request. 
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that the interaction term is statistically significant with a positive sign. This 
means that a denser road network indeed reduces this state capability, which 
differs from the initial hypothesis. This could mean that ruggedness is not 
overcome by increasing the road network in more rugged countries; on the 
contrary, it weakens state ability to control inflation. Although this could be the 
result of roads easing the transmission mechanism of factor costs’ changes into 
final prices, 17  the statistical interpretation is that roads do not reduce the 
negative effect of TRI on our inflation-transformed variable in rugged 
countries.18 This implies that there might be some other mechanisms through 
which monetary policy is transmitted with regard to rugged countries and they 
need to be accounted for.19  
Column 3 introduces some controls to the previous specification and the results 
do not change. Columns 4 to 6 add different specifications for TRI and the 
interaction effect between TRI and RD. The results suggest that higher road 
density is associated with higher state capacity on average but a denser road 
network makes the negative effect of bad topography in rugged countries 
worse. 
Panel B in Table 2 presents the results using rule of law as the indicator for 
state capacity. Basically, our estimates show that RD is positively associated 
with our transformed variable rule of law. This means that more roads are 
associated with better law and order enforcement over the period analysed for 
the average country. It could be that the construction of roads facilitates the 
coordination of authorities to provide law and order or even heightens the 
presence of the state’s representatives throughout the country.20 Despite these 
                                                 
17 For instance, an increase in the cost of inputs (e.g. petrol) could lead to deeper inflationary 
pressures in rugged countries as they might have a different cost structure (reflecting higher 
transportation costs) than less rugged countries.  
18 Another interpretation is that the marginal cost of road usage in more rugged countries is 
higher and this cost cannot be offset even by the physical presence of a road, resulting in 
higher prices. 
19  Another avenue of research is to analyse how state’s authorities are able to broadcast 
monetary policy to the hinterland in the presence of roads compared to cases where roads are 
non-existent. A more precise statistical investigation is needed to find the correct transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in rugged countries.  
20  Another mechanism through which enforcement of rule of law could work is that the 
construction of roads improves the spatial distribution of courts, number of judges, and so on, 
enhancing the state capacity to provide law and order.  
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findings, the interaction term between RD and TRI displays a sign contrary to 
the previous expectation (Columns 8–12), meaning that a denser road network 
makes the enforcement of rule of law worse in more rugged countries. This 
highlights the need to understand how financial and legal institutions spread 
into the hinterland in more rugged countries with better road connections. 
Panel A in Table 3 displays the estimates using taxation as a proxy for state 
capacity. Following the findings of Chapter 2 that TRI exerts a linear effect on 
the state’s extractive capacity, we present results using a linear specification. 
Column 1 shows that RD is not statistically significant for tax collection on 
average. Column 2 introduces the interaction term between RD and TRI. 
Although the result is not statistically significant, the sign is as expected. 
Column 3 adds some controls to the specification and remarkably, the 
interaction term becomes statistically significant at 10 per cent level, showing 
that road density could improve the capacity to collect taxes over time in more 
rugged countries.21 This finding is more in line with the original hypothesis 
emphasising the possible role of road infrastructure as a means for the central 
government to extract resources from the hinterland, either by imposition or by 
increasing the people’s willingness to pay taxes in rugged areas. 
Panel B in Table 3 displays the results employing the presence of civil war as 
an indicator of state capacity. RD estimates are not statistically significant in 
different model specifications (Columns 4–9). The presence of RD in the 
estimating equation does not alter the coefficient nor the statistical significance 
of TRI on the final outcome. In general, RD is not statistically related to this 
outcome of state capacity, and the interaction effect between TRI and RD, 
although showing the expected coefficient, does not reduce the negative impact 
of rugged topography on a state’s outcomes. 
In summary, we find that RD increases inflation, worsens the enforcement of 
the rule of law and improves tax collection performance in more rugged 
                                                 
21  The correlation between initial income per capita and government expenditure is 0.25, 
reducing the likelihood of observing multicollinearity. However, unreported estimations show 
that results do not differ when initial income per capita is removed from the specification.  
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countries. Conversely, it is associated with lower inflation and better rule of 
law in non-rugged countries.  
3.4.2. Fiscal Decentralisation 
Another important characteristic of a country is whether the task of collecting 
public revenue is mainly performed by a central authority or shared between 
different levels of government. In this subsection we investigate whether fiscal 
decentralisation could be a factor to mitigate the negative effects of terrain 
ruggedness on outcomes of state’s behaviour. Panel A in Table 4 displays the 
results using inflation as an indicator of state capacity. Column 1 shows that 
FD has no significant effect on inflation for all countries in the sample. 
However, Columns 2 and 4 show that FD has a statistically significant impact 
on more rugged countries. While FD has a negative effect on inflation on 
average, it has better results for inflation in more rugged countries. 
Panel B in Table 4 displays the results using rule of law as a proxy capturing 
the state capacity to enforce law and order. Estimates in Columns 6 to 10 
suggest that there is no statistically significant effect of FD on this state 
capacity outcome.  
Panel A in Table 5 shows the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the state’s 
extractive capacity. Estimates in Columns 1 to 3 show that FD reduces the state 
capacity to collect taxes on average. The interaction term between FD and TRI 
is not statistically significant; although the sign is as expected. 
Panel B in Table 5 presents the estimates using the presence of civil war to 
infer state capacity. Results in Columns 4 to 8 suggest that FD reduces the state 
capacity to avoid the onset of civil conflict. Additionally, the negative effect of 
TRI on state capacity could not be reversed by FD on average. However, the 
estimate of the interaction term between FD and TRI in Column 7 suggests that 
FD reduces the presence of civil wars in more rugged countries. 
In general, we find evidence suggesting that FD reduces the likelihood of long-
term inflation and civil war in more rugged countries. Additionally, we find, as 
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a by-product of our estimates, that FD reduces the ability of the states to collect 
taxes in general.  
3.4.3. Political Decentralisation 
Next, we analyse whether centralised or shared political decision making has 
consequences for state capacity and more importantly if there is a role for 
political constitutions to reduce the negative impact of terrain ruggedness in 
countries where this physical characteristic is more predominant.  
Panel A in Table 6 presents the results when using inflation to proxy state 
capacity. The estimates in Columns 1 to 6 show that PA increases the 
likelihood of higher inflation over time. However, this effect is reversed for 
rugged countries since the interaction between TRI and PA is statistically 
significant in all specifications and with the predicted sign. Thus, rugged 
countries with a decentralised political making system are more likely to have 
a better state apparatus. 
Panel B in Table 6 displays the relationship between PA and rule of law. The 
estimates in Columns 7 to 12 suggest that there is no significant effect of this 
constitutional feature on the capacity to enforce law and order. Also, the 
interaction effect is not statistically significant, meaning that there is no 
statistical difference between politically autonomous rugged countries and 
more politically centralised rugged countries. 
Panel A in Table 7 presents the results when using tax extraction as an 
indicator of state capacity. The estimates are not statistically significant. Thus, 
PA has no statistical influence as a source undermining or enhancing this state 
capacity. 
Panel B in Table 7 shows the estimates using the presence of civil war as a 
proxy for state capacity. Column 4 suggests that PA increases the likelihood of 
civil war, though this result is not robust as shown by insignificant estimates in 
other specifications. The interaction term between TRI and PA in Columns 7 
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and 8 show that more rugged countries with a politically autonomous system 
are more likely to be classified as weak states. 
Overall, we find that PA is associated with less inflation and an increased 
likelihood of facing civil conflict in more rugged countries. Additionally, we 
observe that the direct effect of this constitutional outcome is higher inflation 
over time for the average country. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Are there factors that mitigate the adverse consequences of terrain ruggedness 
on state capacity? Chapters 2’s main findings show that rugged terrain hinders 
different capabilities of the state. However, this conclusion does not mean that 
countries that are challenged from a topographic point of view have to remain 
weak since human-made factors could reduce the negative effect of difficult 
terrain. Our findings suggest that an increase in road density is associated with 
more tax collection in more rugged countries. However, we find that a denser 
road network could cause a reduction in the state capability with respect to 
controlling inflation and enforcing the rule of law.  
Moreover, our research shows that fiscal decentralisation reduces the 
likelihood of long-term inflation and the presence of civil war in more rugged 
countries. Finally, we find that political autonomy produces different 
outcomes. While this constitutional characteristic is associated with lower 
inflation in more rugged countries, it also increases the probability of facing 
civil conflict in such countries. 
Even though the policy implication of this research is that adopting fiscal 
decentralisation could help rugged countries to reduce transaction costs and 
foster state capacity, one might need to understand what triggers reforms in 
first place. The approach taken here (and also a caveat of this study) is to treat 
denser road networks, fiscal decentralisation and political autonomy as 
exogenous variables. Further understanding of the political economy of road 
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construction, fiscal decentralisation and political autonomy could help to 
provide better responses as to when it is advisable to embark on such reforms.  
Although, the main aim of this research was to explain differences in the 
infrastructure and institutional design of rugged countries, we find that higher 
road density is associated with less inflation and greater enforcement of rule of 
law in non-rugged countries. This opens the door for future research exploring 
the mechanisms through which road density could increase some state capacity 
outcomes in non-rugged countries.  
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Tables 
Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables TRI RD (km of roads/ 
sq. km of land) 
FD (revenue collected by local 
governments/ total revenue in 
%)  
PA (1 if politically 
autonomous; 0 
otherwise) 
     
Mean 1.372 0.801 22.901  
Standard deviation 1.336 2.508 15.610  
Median 0.944 0.250 22.764  
Max 6.740 31.75 80.531  
Min 0.002 0.004 2.020  
Frequency:      
0    112 
1    18 
     
Observations 192 182 69 130 
 
Table 1b. Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables RD  FD  PA  
    
RD 1.000   
FD -0.1678 1.000  
PA  0.1107 0.1847 1.000 
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Appendix 
A1. Data Sources and Descriptions 
Variable Source Description Link 
Inflation World Bank (2013), World 
Development Indicators 
database.  
GDP deflator (annual %) http://databank.worldbank.org 
Rule of law Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
 http://info.worldbank.org/governan
ce/wgi/index.asp 
Tax revenue/ 
GDP 
World Bank (2013), World 
Development Indicators 
database. 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) http://databank.worldbank.org 
Civil conflict Uppsala University 
Conflict Program and 
International Peace 
Research Institute (2013), 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset  
Presence of civil war http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp
/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict
_dataset/ 
TRI Nunn and Puga (2012)  http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
Alesina et al. (2003)  http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/facul
ty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloa
ds/fractionalization.xls 
Government size World Bank (2013), World 
Development Indicators 
database. 
Expense (% of GDP) http://databank.worldbank.org 
Colonial origins 
and independence 
years 
Acemoglu et al. (2008) and 
Olsson (2009) 
 http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/ac
emoglu/data/ajry2008 
Legal origins La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2008) 
 http://www.economics.harvard.edu
/faculty/shleifer/files/JEL_%20web
.xls 
Latitude, area Nunn and Puga (2012)  http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
 
 
  
 
 Empirically Testing the Persistence of Chapter 4:
Power, Elites and Institutions: Evidence from 
Land Reforms around the World, 1900–2010   
4.1. Introduction 
While some scholars find that political institutions are important for economic 
outcomes, such as income (Persson & Tabellini 2009; Rodrik 1999), others do 
not find that different political institutions produce any systematically different 
economic outcomes (Barro 1999; Mulligan, Gil & Sala-i-Martin 2004; Perotti 
1996). Recent research in comparative political economy has tried to explain 
this empirical puzzle by incorporating features of dynamic societal conflict into 
models of political games. Societal conflict is modelled as two groups—the 
rich/elite and the poor/citizens—continuously fighting to gain ‘ruling’ power to 
set their preferred institutional design and thereby control the political and 
economic sphere, both in the present and in the future (Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson 2005).  
Thus, the set of institutions at a certain point in time corresponds to the 
equilibrium point as a result of the battle between these two groups. It is 
important to note that this equilibrium is path dependent in that the set of 
institutions available at a particular time is constrained by past institutions 
(Lagunoff 2009). For instance, when the elites are the ruling power, they may 
choose repressive political institutions that allow them to impose pro-elite 
economic institutions and have more control over economic resources, such as 
dictatorship in the political arena and slavery as an economic institution. 1 
Furthermore, if the masses hold more political power at a certain point in time, 
political institutions will be favourable towards accepting a broad political 
                                                 
1 One might think of other examples but the main point is that elites are small powerful groups 
that try to dominate the masses though disproportionate political representation. Thus, 
dictatorships and oligarchies are more likely to be political regimes used by the elites to exert 
political control. Conversely, when the citizens are able to control the elites, it is expected that 
a political institution with broader representation such as democracy will emerge. 
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representation such as democracy. Citizens in power would try to distribute 
resources more widely from the economic output and thus economic 
institutions will be more pro-citizen (e.g. progressive taxation). 
However, one question arises: why are there countries with ‘broad’ political 
representation yet pro-elite economic institutions? Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2008) contend that the key to explaining this conundrum lies in differentiating 
two distinct types of political power: de jure and de facto. The former refers to 
the way the legal framework allocates political power and the latter to the way 
political power is allocated and executed in reality. Thus, countries that appear 
to be democratic by de jure political power might have repressive economic 
institutions if the elites dominate the political spectrum2 and can impose rules 
for their own interests by using their de facto political power. 
The core idea of this essay is to investigate these interactions of power 
empirically, namely de jure and de facto political power and their subsequent 
influence on the adoption of pro-citizen economic institutions. We exploit the 
historic fact that land has been an economic resource controlled by elites from 
the agricultural era and that a change in the ownership of this resource, in a 
collective sense, implies a change in the structure of power within a society (de 
Janvry 1981; World Bank 2009).  
One key historical feature of elite domination of the land is related to the 
accumulation of extensive amounts of land since the latter has always been 
seen as an important factor of production, and hence, wealth (Galor, Moav & 
Vollrath 2009). The feudal system in Europe is an example where the 
aristocracy could impose their preferred political and economic institutions, as 
they owned the land and had all the political power. This system came to an 
end when citizens accumulated enough political power and demanded change. 
The elites were forced to surrender some power and to adopt a system with 
broader political representation to make a credible commitment to 
                                                 
2 Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) label this situation as a ‘captured democracy’ 
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redistribution and thereby avoid a more costly revolution by the citizens 
(Acemoglu & Robinson 2001).3 
Thus, we use a unique and newly-constructed dataset of 280 land reforms 
enacted in parliaments around the world in the last 110 years in 150 countries 
to analyse the links between economic policies, political institutions and the 
distribution of power within countries. The data indicate that 33 per cent of the 
reforms are either unimplemented or only partially implemented. Thus, we 
exploit the differences between parliamentary enactment and executive 
implementation of land reforms and ascribe the lack of full implementation to 
elite resistance. With this measure of elite strength at hand, we test whether or 
not pro-citizen economic institutions (e.g. open trade regime, competitive 
labour markets, regulation of monopolies and oligopolies) are more likely to 
arise when political institutions are truly representative and the citizens have at 
least as much political power as the elites. At this point, the essay focuses on a 
partial scenario, which is the second stage of the game between the elites and 
the citizens centred on the implementation of already enacted land reforms. 
Consequently, our results may actually be an understatement of the role of elite 
strength in economic policy-making; a deeper focus taking into account the 
first stage of the game (i.e. the enactment itself) could provide a more complete 
picture of the phenomenon theorised by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008).4  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses theories regarding the 
persistence of elites and political transitions, analyses the importance of land as 
the main determinant of political power and reviews different mechanisms by 
which land holdings can impact on economic outcomes. Section 4.3  discusses 
the original dataset generated in this research, the econometric framework, 
other data used and the results. Section 4.4 concludes. 
                                                 
3 The elites could also repress the revolution but this could lead to a larger loss for them in 
cases where the citizens have enough political power. Thus, the rational action for the elites is 
to lose some political power by democratising the political system rather than losing it all by 
repressing the masses. 
4 We leave this extension for future research. 
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4.2. Testable Hypothesis 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) posit that the interaction between different 
types of political power can lead to different political and economic settings. 
Specifically, they demonstrate theoretically the existence of a switching 
political equilibrium with different options for economic institutions depending 
on which group has more power. In summary, they find that: 
i) Competitive economic institutions are adopted when there is a broad 
political representation of the masses and where elites are constrained 
(democracy); 
ii) Pro-elite economic institutions are adopted when the political regime 
represents the interest of the elites (non-democracy); and 
iii) Pro-elite economic institutions are adopted when elites are able to exert 
power on the political system (de facto political power) even if the de 
jure political power represents the masses. This equilibrium is called 
captured democracy. 
These predictions suggest that changes in political institutions, from non-
democracy to democracy, do not imply that economic institutions will 
necessarily change accordingly (e.g. from repressive economic institutions to 
competitive economic institutions). In fact, there is a possibility that 
democracy could co-exist with repressive economic institutions and this 
equilibrium basically depends on the elites’ strength. 
The whole process of change from one political regime to the other implies a 
constant challenge for power between the groups involved. Historically, these 
two groups have been named elites and citizens. Since the first agrarian 
societies, land has been an important productive factor in the economic process 
and therefore a key component in determining people’s wealth. Thus, holdings 
of land have always reflected the structure of power in a society (Baland & 
Robinson 2012; Barraclough 1973; Galor, Moav & Vollrath 2009). 
Landowners can therefore be implicitly identified as the elites while peasants 
or landless people represent the citizens. 
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For centuries, the elites dominated the political and economic scene and 
imposed their political system (feudalism) and economic policies. Growing 
dissatisfaction of the repressed with the political and economic status quo is, 
however, inevitable under such conditions; the more repressed citizens are the 
more latent revolt they are likely to harbour. Arguably, in all such cases, 
citizens were provoked to challenge the system that repressed them and, where 
possible, demanded stronger political representation linked to redistribution. 
Famous examples of such changes are the Glorious Revolution and the French 
Revolution (Huang 2012).5  
In such a scenario, elites are faced with the question of how to minimise their 
losses. The least costly option, and that which allows the elites to maintain 
control over the means of economic production, is the compromise of allowing, 
at least de jure, a higher degree of political representation to the citizen 
majority. Thus, to avoid total loss—indeed land is very easy to confiscate 
given that it is a fixed and non-liquid asset (Boix 2003)—the best course of 
action for the elites is to democratise the system. As Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001) state, democratisation is the only credible commitment to redistribution 
that the elites can make to the citizens. Any commitment that is not credible at 
the time could result in confiscation of their land by the citizens (a prime 
example is that of Russia in 1917). 
Note that the main objective of the elites is to avoid a total loss of both 
economic and political power and to minimise any loss of each. To do this they 
need to convince the citizens that the means to achieve a less extractive 
outcome is in their hands. If this is adequate to placate the social upheaval 
tending towards revolution, then the elites may still be able to retain effective 
control over much of the political system, as well as the economic resources. 
Essentially, while granting this means to citizens is necessary, it is not 
sufficient for guaranteeing a more proportionate distribution of resources 
within an economy. That is, democratisation could just be on paper. In 
                                                 
5 Besley and Persson (2009) offer a unified theoretical model of repression and civil war. The 
incumbent engages in repression to avoid seizure from an opposing group. Civil war emerges 
when the opposing group sees that the political institutions are non-inclusive and wages are 
low. 
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functional terms, the elites could still be in a position to exert control over 
political outcomes in a less obvious manner, leading to the mitigation of any 
concrete pro-citizen reform and blocking any effective intent of redistribution. 
This could explain why some democracies are not functional to citizens’ 
preferences. A commonly observed example of such a process historically is 
that pertaining to democratisation and land reform; indeed land reforms are an 
expected outcome in democracy given that the citizens want redistribution. 
However, if the elites retain their effective power, they may still be able to 
block any intended land reform from ever being implemented.  
In effect, such a process of democratisation is false as it is in name only; there 
is a redistribution of de jure but not de facto political representation. The only 
necessary factor to ensure the success of such a false democratisation from the 
elites’ point of view is the belief of the majority of the citizens that there has 
been a meaningful transition of political power. If this requires the elites to go 
so far as to sanction a reform, on paper, then this is a valuable move. So as 
long as the elites maintain the ability to block the reforms from actually being 
implemented in the end, then the major achievement of averting costly social 
upheaval without having to relinquish any real power has succeeded. All the 
elites require, therefore, is the ability to control the policymakers, the 
bureaucracy or simply weaken the state so it has limited capability (Acemoglu, 
Ticchi & Vindigni 2011). 
In sum, this could be conceived as a two-stage game. The first priority will be 
to achieve a perceived compromise by enacting a land reform to avoid any full 
scale political and economic upheaval and therefore any confiscation of the 
elites’ land resources from the citizens. The second stage will be to invest 
resources to block the implementation, should the citizen’s continue to pursue 
the reform to its stated end.  
4.3. Empirical Analysis 
We examine the relationship between elites’ strength and the adoption of 
economic policies that are meant to be favourable for the average citizen by 
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analysing whether the enactment and implementation of land reforms are 
predictors of those policies. 
4.3.1. Estimating Equation 
To estimate the relations described in the theoretical section, we first introduce 
our baseline model: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚଶܫ௜௧ ൅ߚଷሺ ௜ܲ௧ כ ܫ௜௧ሻ ൅ ݁௜௧ 
where ௜ܻ௧is pro-citizen economic policy in country i at time t, ௜ܲ௧ denotes 
elites’ power (or lack of it), ܫ௜௧measures the level of democracy, and ݁௜௧ is the 
error term. The interaction term between elites’ power and political regimes 
aims to capture Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2008) predictions regarding the 
way elites behave within the existent political regime.  
4.3.2. Data Description 
4.3.2.1. Pro-Citizen Policy 
We use the well-known Sachs and Warner (SW) (1995) indicator of trade 
openness, updated by Wacziarg and Welch (WW) (2008), to measure pro-
citizen economic policies. The Sachs-Warner-Wacziarg-Welch indicator 
(SWWW) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the country satisfies 
five criteria for openness or zero otherwise. Our main reasoning with this 
indicator is related to trade theory. Trade openness is typically beneficial for 
citizens’ welfare as it increases the return to labour in labour-abundant 
countries and enables access to a variety of goods at relatively lower costs. 
Countries where elites dominated the political scene are mainly labour-
abundant developing countries.6 
We acknowledge, however, that this indicator may not perfectly reflect pro-
citizen economic policies. Other important dimensions of these policies such as 
inclusiveness, redistribution or fair competition are not explicitly considered by 
                                                 
6 Additionally, the SWWW indicator spans over a long period of time, which is necessary to 
analyse changes in the structure of societies and persistence of institutions. 
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the SWWW indicator and might be left out of our analysis. However, the 
measure has an advantage over other (and typically continuous) measures of 
trade openness, because it captures a shift in broader economic policy-making, 
rather than an incremental change in an openness metric. Regrettably, variables 
such as public education, social security or health coverage, antimonopoly 
laws, and income distribution are not available for longer periods for many 
countries.7 
4.3.2.2 Land Reform Enactments and Implementations 
Identification of elites’ strength is actually captured by its antithesis, the 
number of times the elites have been weakened; we consider the number of 
land reforms that have been implemented in a country as an indicator of the 
lack of strength of its elites. To this end, a unique and novel dataset constructed 
by Bhattacharya and Ulubasoglu (2012) is broadened, cross-checked and 
updated so that it contains all major land reforms that have been enacted and 
implemented worldwide from 1900 until 2010. The main sources of the dataset 
are peer-reviewed articles, country studies and handbook series by the Federal 
Research Division of the US Library of Congress, several databases and 
publications from FAO, USAID Land Tenure and Property Rights Portal, 
among others. The Appendix elaborates how this dataset is used for this essay.  
A binary variable, 0 or 1, is used to denote the absence or existence of land 
reform, respectively, for each country and each year. Additionally, another 
binary variable, 0 or 1, denotes if a specific parliamentary enacted land reform 
has been implemented. Taking the original documentation used by 
Bhattacharya and Ulubasoglu (2012), a more refined version of this variable is 
generated. Specifically a new variable for reform implementation is 
constructed where the implementation of land reforms attracts a value of 1, and 
0 otherwise. This variable can also take a mid-range value (0.5) if the 
                                                 
7 The SWWW classification of trade openness starts after 1945. We use the 1945 values for the 
1900–1945 period for each country. The error association with this assumption is expected to 
be minimal because only a handful of countries—predominantly today’s developed 
countries—had a score of ͂1’ in 1945.  
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information regarding the implementation of a specific land reform indicates 
that the land reform was implemented only partially. 
Bhattacharya and Ulubasoglu (2012) classify each enactment of land reform 
based on its nature. These authors follow de Janvry (1981), Csaki (2000) and 
Deininger (2002) to broadly divide land reforms into two main categories: 
traditional and market oriented. Traditional land reforms took place principally 
before the nineties and the main aim was to transform different characteristics 
of the agrarian structures such as modes of production, class structure and 
regimes of land tenure. Public policy mechanisms, in general, were used to 
carry out these reforms and the related motives can be subcategorised as: (i) 
establishment of a landholding cap, (ii) redistribution of private land, (iii) 
distribution of public land, (iv) restitution of land, (v) privatisation of public 
land, and (vi) other motives.8 However, these sub-categories are not mutually 
exclusive. For instance, land reforms aiming to redistribute private farms were 
usually accompanied by a landholding cap in order to create room for 
expropriation and then proceed with the redistribution component.  
Market-oriented land reforms, on the other hand, took place mainly during and 
after the nineties and aimed mainly to establish markets for land, which would 
minimise direct intervention by government or public authorities. Three main 
components were necessary for this: the recognition of property rights, the 
adoption of mechanisms regulating the privatisation of public land, and the 
development of procedures to regulate the transferability of property rights 
(Deininger 2002). Note that traditional and market-oriented land reforms are 
also not mutually exclusive. For instance, some countries in Eastern Europe 
decided to restore land that was taken by the State during their experience with 
socialism to its original owners and in doing so also created a market for land. 
For this chapter, all of these entries are cross-checked and updated with 
relevant information. Additionally, this classification is expanded to record 
                                                 
8 The ‘other’ category included land reforms aiming to increase farms productivity, allocate 
subsides and public credit, etc. 
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information as to whether each land reform motive has seen a successful 
implementation. 
We count 280 land reforms as having been enacted, with 48 per cent of them 
having been fully implemented and 28 per cent partially implemented. Table 1 
shows a snapshot of this dataset. It is interesting to note that 65 land reforms 
aimed to redistribute private land and 77 per cent of them were implemented.  
To capture the number of times the elites have been defeated by citizens in the 
first stage of the game, we count land reform enactments at time t. We refer to 
this variable as ‘enactment’. We proceed in the same manner to obtain the 
variable ‘implementation’ to reflect the number of times elites have lost the 
battle against citizens in the second stage of the game. These two variables 
indicate the number of times they have been weakened by the citizens. 
4.3.2.3 Political Regime 
To capture the level of formal political regime or de jure political power, we 
use the variable Polity2 obtained from the Polity IV Project database compiled 
by the Center of Systemic Peace. This variable takes values between -10 and 
10 to denote strong autocracy and strong democracy, respectively. 
4.3.3. Econometric Methodology 
Our econometric methodology is to estimate our baseline equation using panel 
data techniques by controlling for country fixed effects. The advantage of this 
methodology is that all time-invariant variables (e.g. legal origins, colonial 
origins, ethno linguistic fractionalisation, distance to the equator, geographic 
and topographic characteristics) that are important in the political economy of 
development literature are accounted for. Additionally, country fixed effects 
take out any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across countries. This 
means that the bias produced by, for instance, country-specific historical 
factors affecting both the dependent and independent variables, is removed. 
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Given the nature and structure of our panel data, the first approach would 
usually be to use a non-linear limited dependent variable method such as a 
probit estimation. However, the use of this methodology in a fixed effect panel 
context attracts reservations as the incidental parameters problem arises, 
resulting in a serious bias of the estimators (Fernández-Val 2009; Greene 
2004). To avoid this problem, our estimation method is initially ordinary least 
squares (OLS), which is known to produce consistent estimates. 
Despite the use of OLS, this estimation procedure does not prevent one from 
having a reverse causality problem, that is, economic liberalisation and the 
enactment (or implementation) of land reforms are part of the same data 
generation process. Thus, we use an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate the 
impact of de jure and de facto political power on economic policies. In a single 
equation framework, the use of IVs requires to have at least one instrument for 
each endogenous variable. However, this is not the case as some specifications 
in our estimating equation require the use of the enactment of land reforms 
together with the implementation of land reforms to disentangle the effect of de 
jure and de facto political power on the choice of economic policies. To handle 
this problem, and given the way our dependent variables are constructed,9 we 
rely on a system-equation estimation procedure. That is, we run two separate 
first-stage regressions, one for each endogenous variable with the instrument 
and in the second stage we use the resulting instrumented variables of the first 
stage. This system is estimated using the capabilities of the command CMP in 
Stata.10  
4.3.4. Results 
We begin by analysing the case where citizens’ power is proxied by the 
number of times that land reforms have been enacted or implemented at time t. 
Table 2 displays the findings. Column 1 uses the number of times all land 
                                                 
9 Specifically, implementation is a subset of enactment.  
10  This command has the advantage of creating a system of equations indicating which 
variables are endogenous so that the instrumented endogenous variables are used directly in the 
second stage without the need to adjust the standard errors. For more references on this 
command, see Roodman (2011).  
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reforms have been enacted as a measure of citizens’ power against the elites. 
The estimate is statistically significant and of the right sign, thus the more land 
reforms that have been legislated in a given country, the more likely it is to 
have pro-citizen economic policies. However, the parliamentary enactment of a 
land reform does not mean that the elite are totally defeated, and in fact, the 
elite may resist the implementation of the reform. We incorporate the number 
of times that all land reforms have been implemented in Column 2 to analyse if 
real implementation matters more than just the enactment of the reform. 
Indeed, the size of the estimate for implementation is statistically significant 
and of the correct sign. Additionally, in Columns 1 and 2, political regime is 
statistically significant and positively related to the adoption of open trade, in 
line with our hypothesis. Column 3 incorporates the interaction term between 
political regime and enactment into the analysis. All estimates are statistically 
significant and with a positive correct sign. Column 4 adds the interaction term 
of implemented and political regime and this has the expected sign but it is 
statistically insignificant. In Column 5 we add our two main variables, 
enactment and implementation, and their interaction terms with political 
regime into the baseline model. The estimate for enactment and its interaction 
term is positive and statistically significant, in line with our assumption. To 
analyse the effect of implementation in this column, we first need to realise 
that this variable is a subset of enactment and given that the latter is 
statistically significant, implementation captures the number of times that 
sanctioned land reforms have not been implemented. Crucially, the coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant. This means that countries where land 
reforms have been sanctioned but not implemented (i.e. strong elites blocking 
implementation) tend to have a more closed economy.  
Although we use country fixed effects to ‘control’ for time-invariant factors, 
we cannot rule out that economic liberalisation and the sanctioning of land 
reforms are part of the same data generation process. This means that there 
might be some unobservable long-run variables influencing both sides of the 
equation. We use IVs to tackle this problem. In our search for a plausible 
instrument for enacted and implemented, we need to find a variable that could 
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influence the adoption and implementation of land reforms without affecting 
the trade regime. 
In our conceptual overview, we explain that the sanctioning of a land reform 
might signal a change in the structure of power within a country and this could 
lead to a tension between the elites and the citizens. Elites, who benefit from 
the status quo, would try to block any land reform or its implementation. 
However, local elites might not be able to resist the change if such reforms are 
demanded by an international power. In the first place, one should ask why 
international powers would care about land reforms. 
After the Second World War (WWII), the US pushed for land reforms in many 
developing countries in Latin America and Asia to avoid the trend of socialism 
and communism sweeping across a number of countries. For instance, the US, 
under the presidency of John F. Kennedy, promoted the so-called Alliance for 
Progress aiming to reduce social and economic disparities within Latin 
American countries as a way of avoiding the rise of socialism and the influence 
of the Soviet Union in the region. Although the program was short-lived, it was 
relatively successful in pressuring countries to adopt land reform (Dorner 1992, 
p. 12).11 Other countries where the US influence led to the enactment of land 
reforms after WWII were Japan and South Korea. Indeed, these countries were 
under the US military administration when the adoption of land reforms took 
place (Jeon & Kim 2002; World Bank 2009). 
We use this stylised fact to start searching for a suitable instrument for our 
model. Specifically, we need to find a variable that is correlated with the 
enactment or sanctioning of a land reform but not correlated with the trade 
regime. Berger et al. (2013) construct a dataset measuring the involvement of 
the US government in foreign countries during the Cold War based on 
                                                 
11 Land reform was one of the main components of the Charter of the Alliance for Progress 
signed in 1961 in Uruguay. Conversely, the main development policy implemented in the 
region at that time was import substitution, which required the adoption of high tariffs. Thus, 
we have on one hand a push for land reform from outside players and on the other hand a push 
for market protection or an unfriendly trade regime from local policymakers.  
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declassified documents by the CIA. 12  Specifically, they construct a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if there is evidence of CIA participation in 
undercover operations in a foreign country during a year, or 0 otherwise. We 
use this variable to instrument our variables enactment and implementation. 
Given that this indicator is available for years after WWII, we lose 24 enacted 
and 14 implemented land reforms from our sample. 
The IV results are displayed on the right-hand side of Table 2. Specifically, we 
use system equation estimation with country fixed effects. Columns 6 and 7 
show that US influence has a negative effect on both the enactment and the 
implementation of all land reforms. This might suggest that on average the US 
presence was not conducive to the enactment and implementation of all land 
reforms. Dorner (1992) manifests that there were some instances where the US 
opposed land reforms when they were driven by governments identified with 
the Soviet Union or where groups promoting land reforms were seen as a threat 
for the US.13 Additionally, we could not expect that all land reforms were 
driven by US influence and hence we cannot be too surprised at the negative 
result for the instrumented variable. Column 8 presents the estimates using the 
IV. Enactment is statistically significant and positive as expected. 
Implementation is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the 
sanctioning of any type of land reforms is directly related to pro-citizen 
economics policies, and that the elite battle for reform mitigation, actually is 
negatively related to the adoption of these policies. Column 11 adds the 
interaction effects of political regime with our enacted and implemented land 
reforms variables. Interestingly, the interaction term between implementation 
and political regime is statistically significant and of a negative sign, 
suggesting that elites try to block implementation even in countries that appear 
to be classified as democracies. 
                                                 
12 Berger et al. (2013) find that during the years when the US supported or gave aid directly to 
install a government in a foreign country, US exports to those countries increased compared to 
the non-influence years. This, however, does not invalidate our instrument as imports from the 
US are not part of the criteria used to construct the SWWW indicator. 
13 For instance, the US government during the 1950s blocked any intent of land reform in the 
Philippines as the land reform movement was led by the Huk insurgency. 
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Even though all land reforms are positively related to trade openness, it is 
difficult to assume that all land reforms could pick up the battle between the 
citizens and the elites. Thus, we further investigate if land reforms whose 
motives are the establishment of a landholding cap, redistribution of private 
land, distribution of public land, restitution of land and privatisation of public 
land (i.e. traditional land reforms) have had a greater impact on pro-citizen 
economic policies. We use these types of land reforms as we consider that they 
might better reflect the struggle for power between the citizens and the elites. 
Table 3 displays the results when using this subset of land reforms. Columns 1 
to 5 show the results using a country fixed effects methodology and Columns 6 
to 11 present the IV estimates. Interestingly, the estimates are very similar to 
those obtained in Table 2. In fact, the estimate using the single equation for 
enactment is statistically significant and with a positive sign, likewise for 
implementation. The IV estimates show that the US influence is negatively 
related to the adoption of traditional land reforms; although some estimates are 
not robust. Again, it is difficult to argue that the majority of traditional land 
reforms were due to the direct influence of the US in foreign countries. Despite 
the latter, we still consider that our instrument is valid and thus we proceed 
with the second stage of the procedure. The instrumented version of enacted is 
positively related to pro-citizen economic policies and the number of times that 
land reforms have been enacted but not implemented are negatively related to 
the adoption of such economic policies. In other words, when elites are strong 
enough to block anti-elite land reforms, the economic policy outcome is likely 
to be a closed economy. Additionally, the sign for the interaction term between 
political regime and the variable implementation is negative, meaning that the 
elites invest their power trying to block implementation even in political 
regimes with a positive score for democracy.  
4.3.4.1 Redistributive Land Reforms 
A finer way to capture the struggle for power between the elites and the 
citizens is to use redistributive land reforms. Specifically, these land reforms 
are aimed at taking private property and redistributing it to peasants. Although 
we do not consider the different mechanisms used by governments to address 
C H A P T E R  F O U R  
109 
 
redistribution, land reforms falling into this subcategory are meant to reflect 
better the battle to maintain or acquire political power. Table 4 show the results 
using redistributive land reforms. Columns 1 to 4 show that enactment and 
implementation are directly related to trade openness. In Column 5, both 
enactment and implementation are used in the same specification. While 
enactment remains statistically significant and with the correct sign, 
implementation (or land reforms that have been passed but not put in practice 
under this specification’s reading) becomes insignificant. The interaction terms 
are statistically significant and of the expected sign. Columns 6, 7, 9 and 10 
show the estimates of the first-stage procedure. Contrary to the previous cases, 
US influence is positively related to the enactment and implementation of 
redistributive land reforms. It is important to note that the size of the estimates 
for enactment is almost double that for implementation, suggesting that the US 
exerted some influence to enact land reforms but that they were less successful 
in trying to push for implementation of those reforms. Column 8 presents the 
estimates for enactment and implementation without the interaction terms. 
Both terms are statistically significant and while enactment is of the correct 
sign, implemented is of the unexpected sign. Column 11 shows that enactment 
and its interaction terms are positive and significant as expected. However, the 
estimate for implemented is unexpectedly positive. This might be the result of 
the high correlation present (0.88) between enacted redistributive land reforms 
and their implementation. The interaction term between implementation of 
land reforms and political regime remain statistically significant and negative 
as in the previous tables.  
In our previous analysis, we used the binary version of the variable 
implementation for redistributive land reforms. Next, we consider a more 
refined version for the variable. In concrete terms, we use a variable that can 
take the values 1, 0.5 and 0 to denote full implementation, partial 
implementation and non-implementation of parliamentary enacted land 
reforms, respectively.14  Table 5 contains the results. Estimates using panel 
                                                 
14 Even though the coding this variable uses a systematic approach, the values are subject to a 
certain unavoidable subjectivity. 
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fixed effects are relatively similar to the ones obtained previously. Thus, we 
are more certain that enactment and implementation of redistributive land 
reforms are positively related to the adoption of trade openness. 
4.4. Conclusions 
This paper adds empirical support to the theoretical prediction that pro-citizen 
economic institutions evolve when both the political system is more 
representative and the elites’ de facto power is controlled. Generally, our 
results show that a reduction in the elites’ strength is related to the adoption of 
trade openness; an economic regime that is more pro-citizen. 
Our empirical support is based on the observation that enacted and 
implemented land reforms may signal a change in the structure of power within 
a country. Thus, more enactments of land reforms could be associated with 
more open economic policies, like an open-trade regime. Additionally, we 
account for the fact that the enactment of a land reform can be blocked by 
powerful elites and therefore may never be implemented. In our study, we find 
that, given enactment, the lack of implementation of land reforms is negatively 
related to the adoption of trade openness. We also find that elites’ strength 
interacts with the political regime significantly, and thus, the adoption of pro-
citizen economic policies depends on this interaction term. In other words, 
powerful elites try to block the adoption of pro-citizens economic institutions 
even in democracies. Even though our results are interesting and could shed 
light on possible political reforms that could bring beneficial economic 
outcomes to citizens, we still need to investigate further the mechanisms 
through which the elites are able to hold de facto political power before 
attempting to provide policy implications. In the present case, we need to pin 
down the different strategies used by the elites to resist the implementation of a 
reform, for instance, the role of the bureaucracy or the judiciary when 
implementing reforms.  
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Additionally, where data is available, this study could be expanded to account 
for other economic policies that could be considered pro-citizen such as the 
adoption of public education, social security or progressive taxation.15  
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Land Reforms 
    
Variables Frequency Variables Frequency 
Total number of land reforms 
enacted 
280 Total number of land reforms 
implemented 
213 
  Number of land reforms fully 
implemented 
135 
  Number of land reforms partially 
implemented 
78 
Number of ‘traditional’ land 
reforms enacted 
155 Number of ‘traditional’ land 
reforms implemented 
126 
Number of redistributive land 
reforms enacted 
65 Number of redistributive land 
reforms implemented 
50 
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Appendix 
A1. Dataset: Enacted and Implemented Land Reforms 
Bhattacharya and Ulubasoglu (2012) constructed a dataset containing 
information on the sanctioning and the implementation of land reforms around 
the world from 1900–2010 over 10-year intervals. They also present 
information regarding the motive of the land reform enacted. 
For this essay, each entry of this dataset was cross-checked by reviewing all 
results produced by search engines such as Google, Google Scholar and 
Scopus by typing land reform + name of the country. The outcome of this 
process was later reviewed and validated by Bhattacharya and Ulubasoglu 
(2012). 
Additionally, the original dataset was converted from 10-year intervals to 
yearly intervals. 
Finally, new binary variables were created to denote whether the particular 
motive for each land reform is achieved on implementation or not. For 
instance, an enacted land reform whose motive is privatisation and 
redistribution could render implementation of the two components, 
implementation of just one component or no implementation at all. These new 
variables aim to capture if each motive is implemented or not. 
A2. Data Sources and Descriptions 
Variable Source Link 
SWWW Wacziarg and Welch. (2008) http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/do
wnloads/liberalization.xls 
Polity2 Polity IV Project; Marshall, 
Gurr and Jaggers (2013) 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2012.xls 
US Influence Berger et al. (2013) http://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/cia_us_trade_
web_appendix_april_2012.pdf 
 
  
 
 
 Conclusions Chapter 5:
This thesis empirically explored the role of physio-geography and elite 
domination of political systems—two main determinants of long-run 
development—on state’s behaviour and the adoption of pro-citizen economic 
policies, respectively. These two characteristics are seen as obstacles for 
cooperation between groups within a society, affecting the collective welfare. 
The first essay, entitled ‘What Underlies Weak States? The Role of Terrain 
Ruggedness’, investigated the research question: Does terrain ruggedness 
constitute a hurdle for state capacity? State capacity is a multidimensional 
concept that cannot be directly observed, but its outcomes can. Thus, the thesis 
adopted a latent variable methodology to estimate the determinants of state 
capacity. Latent variables were derived from four basic capabilities that a 
modern state is expected to perform at the minimum—commit to policies (for 
which inflation is used as proxy), provide and enforce rule of law, tax citizens, 
and restrict civil violence. Data for terrain ruggedness were based on satellite 
images from the project GTOPO30, a global dataset developed through 
international collaboration led by the US Geological Survey Centre, 
constructed by Riley, DeGloria and Elliot (1999), and updated by Nunn and 
Puga (2012). Other important covariates incorporated in the estimating 
equation as controls were ethnic fractionalisation, colonial origins, year of 
independence, legal origins and distance from the equator. The empirical 
equation was estimated using a logit model, with the marginal effects 
computed and presented. 
The findings showed that terrain ruggedness has a non-linear negative effect on 
state capacity when the latent variables are inflation, rule of law and presence 
of civil war, and a linear negative effect when state capacity is proxied by 
taxation. The results held to numerous variations in sample composition of 
countries, such as excluding continents one at a time, small countries, 
developed countries or countries without a history of colonialism. The array of 
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specifications and subsamples used in the empirical section showed that there 
is not a specific country or set of countries driving the results.  
Nevertheless, these results were obtained from a reduced form framework. In 
other words, there is a black box between terrain ruggedness and state capacity 
that needs to be investigated. As the literature emphasises that cities can be 
regarded as products of successful of cooperation, this essay explored the role 
of early urbanisation, representing early cooperation in collective action, as a 
transmission mechanism between terrain ruggedness and state capacity. Results 
indicated that terrain ruggedness is negatively related to urbanisation in 1900, 
meaning that more rugged countries had less urbanised cities in 1900. When 
early urbanisation and terrain ruggedness were taken together as explanatory 
variables in the estimating equation, early urbanisation was found to constitute 
a channel through which rugged topography has an impact on three state 
capabilities; enforcing rule of law, taxing citizens and avoiding civil conflicts. 
Although the main argument of the essay was that rugged topography affects 
state capacity through its impact on transaction costs, other factors might also 
matter for a capable state, such as initial elite domination and artificial states. 
To account for these factors, land Gini at independence and Alesina, Easterly 
and Matuszeski’s (2011) fractal measure of artificial states was incorporated 
into the estimating equation. The estimates showed that these variables do not 
greatly modify the standard errors of the terrain ruggedness variable. It is 
important to note, however, that the land Gini coefficient at independence does 
not totally capture how initial elite domination might shape state capacity (e.g. 
initial set of institutions, development of bureaucracy, and initial regime type). 
Indeed, disentangling the linkages between physio-geography, initial elite 
domination, political inequality and current levels of state capacity are a 
fruitful avenue for future research in the political economy of development. 
The results of the first essay formed the impetus for the second essay in the 
thesis, entitled ‘State Capacity: How to Mitigate the Adverse Consequences of 
Terrain Ruggedness?’. The statistical finding that countries with more rugged 
terrain might find it more difficult to build a state apparatus that can support 
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the achievement of desirable long-term economic and political outcomes does 
not imply that such countries should be stagnant or idle about state capacity 
building. Specifically, the essay analysed whether road density, fiscal 
decentralisation and political autonomy act as mitigating factors to alleviate the 
negative effect of terrain ruggedness on state capacity outcomes. 
As in the previous essay, a latent approach was considered to find suitable 
indicators for state capacity and the statistical relationships were estimated 
using a logit model. The estimates showed that a denser road network in fact 
increased the probability of collecting more tax revenue in rugged countries, 
compared to non-rugged countries. Conversely, higher road density was 
statistically associated with a reduced ability to control inflation and enforce 
the rule of law over the long run in more rugged countries; results that were 
contrary to the initial hypothesis. There might be other interaction effects 
through which a higher road density might affect these state capacity 
outcomes, such as the access to financial institutions and to liquidity, things 
that people living in rugged areas could then access as a result of the 
construction of roads connecting those areas with the political or financial 
centre. An analysis of the effects of geography on the location of the financial 
institutions and the spread of access to credit are interesting areas of future 
research. There was no significant statistical association between road density 
and the outbreak of civil conflict 
With respect to fiscal decentralisation, the results showed that decentralisation 
is beneficial to mitigate the effect of rough geography for controlling inflation 
and avoiding the outbreak of civil conflict in more rugged countries. This fiscal 
arrangement is not statistically associated with higher tax collection 
performance and the ability to enforce rule of law. 
Finally, the essay’s findings demonstrated that political autonomy robustly 
reduces the negative effect of terrain ruggedness on inflation in more rugged 
countries. Political autonomy also reduces the state capacity to prevent the 
disruption of civil conflict, a result that was opposite to the initial expectation. 
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There is no clear link between political autonomy and enforcement of rule of 
law and tax collection in more rugged countries. 
The mixed statistical evidence in the second essay suggests the need to handle 
carefully any policy recommendation. Even though the results showed that 
fiscal decentralisation could assist to improve capabilities for controlling 
inflation and preventing civil wars, the scope of the essay was not to analyse 
what drives fiscal decentralisation in the first place. Understanding the political 
economy of fiscal decentralisation is indeed a topic for future research.  
Finally, the third essay, entitled ‘Empirically Testing the Persistence of Power, 
Elites and Institutions: Evidence from Land Reforms around the World, 1900–
2010’, empirically tested Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2008) predictions 
regarding the interactions of elites, political power and pro-citizen economic 
policies. Specifically, it tested whether (i) pro-citizen economic policies arise 
when the political system is democratic and the elites are constrained, (ii) pro-
elite economic policies are adopted when the political system is undemocratic 
and represents the interest of the elites; and (iii) pro-elite economic institutions 
arise when elites are able to exert power on the political system (de facto 
political power) even if the de jure political power represents the masses. 
Generally, elite domination of the political system is seen as a major barrier for 
a more equitable development process. Excessive concentration of political 
power is related to the adoption of economic policies that are in line with those 
holding power and which do not always tend to favour the masses. The 
literature has identified two main types of political power—de jure political 
power, which comes from the constitution, laws and political regime, and de 
facto political power, which comes from informal institutions and reveals who 
the real holders of political power are. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) theorise that these two types of power plus 
their interaction matter for the adoption of pro-citizen economic policies. To 
measure the latter, this thesis adopted Sachs and Warner’s (1995) widely used 
indicator of trade openness for favourable economic policies. De jure political 
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power is proxied by the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project. De facto 
political power comes from a unique dataset that contains detailed information 
on the enactment and implementation of land reforms on a sample of 150 
countries spanning the period 1900 to 2010. The empirical equation is 
estimated using panel techniques that account for country fixed effects. 
The results indicated that countries that are de jure more democratic tend to 
adopt a more open trade regime. Countries that have enacted more land 
reforms are more likely to be in favour of trade openness, and those that have 
implemented more land reforms appear to adopt more open trade policies. The 
results also showed that countries where land reforms have been enacted but 
not implemented are more likely to have a closed trade policy regime. 
An econometric problem in the essay was endogeneity due to omitted variables 
that may be associated with de facto political power. There might as well be 
reverse causality from trade openness to political power, but this link was less 
clear-cut. The endogeneity problem in the analysis was addressed by using IV 
estimation. Despite its limited time span covering less than 110 years, US 
influence on a country, proxied by covert CIA operations, as an IV for land 
reforms enactment and implementation, confirmed the previous results.  
The essay made a further distinction between land reforms motivated by 
redistributive goals and other objectives such as the establishment of a 
landholding cap, distribution of public land, restitution of confiscated land, 
privatisation of public land, access to credit and allocation of subsidies among 
others. Redistributive land reforms are likely to capture better the struggle 
between elites and masses. Recognising this distinction shows that countries 
where elites opposed the implementation of a redistributive land reform that 
has already been enacted are more likely to become a closed trade regime.  
These findings are important as they confirm Acemoglu and Robison (2008)’s 
conjectures and shed light on the political determinants of economic policies. 
The major finding of the essay was that democratic countries where the elites 
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have been constrained tend to choose economic policies that are more in line 
with the benefit of the masses. 
In sum, the contribution of these three essays is the discovery of two specific 
factors—terrain ruggedness and elite domination—as obstacles undermining 
the cooperation and cohesiveness of different groups in societies. The finding 
about terrain ruggedness hindering state capacity development is new in the 
literature; its merit is precisely to demonstrate empirically that this 
geographical feature constitutes a challenge to build a more capable state 
apparatus. Current literature emphasises the role of geographical factors in 
increasing transactions costs within societies and for fostering development 
and pledges to find solutions to palliate these costs. The findings of the second 
essay suggest some avenues to mitigate the adverse effects of ruggedness on 
state capacity. Specifically, fiscal decentralisation is beneficial to reduce 
inflation and the outbreak of civil wars in more rugged countries. Finally, a 
unique dataset containing detailed information on land reforms and their 
motives over 1900–2010 to proxy elite power enabled the third essay to 
empirically confirm Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2008) predictions, enhancing 
the current knowledge on the role that elites play in the selection of economic 
policies and in the long-term development of economies. 
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